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Abstract

Consumer bankruptcy filing rates have soared during the past 25 years. From
225,000 filings in 1979, consumer bankruptcies topped 1.5 million during 2004.
This relentless upward trend is striking in light of the generally high prosperity, low interest rates, and low unemployment during that period. This anomaly
of ever-upward bankruptcy filing rates during a period of economic prosperity
had spurred calls to reform the Bankruptcy Code to place new conditions on
bankruptcy relief. Although bankruptcy reform has drawn broad bipartisan support on Capitol Hill, these proposals have proven controversial within the academy.
Critics have argued that these reforms are unnecessary and punitive, and that private market adjustments such as higher interest rates and more restrictive credit
rationing are suitable policy responses.
Scholars have previously identified two models of the consumer bankruptcy process, the traditional “distress” model and the economic “incentives” model. Neither, however, can explain the observed bankruptcy filing patterns of recent decades.
This article offers a new model of consumer bankruptcy rooted in New Institutional Economics that explains the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings as reflecting changes in the institutions, incentives, and constraints surrounding the consumer bankruptcy filing decision. It is argued that this new model of consumer
bankruptcy is both theoretically and empirically superior to the traditional model.
This article identifies three institutional factors that can explain the observed rise
in bankruptcy filings over the past several decades: (1) A change in the relative
economic costs and benefits associated with filing bankruptcy; (2) A change in
social norms regarding bankruptcy; and (3) Changes in the nature of consumer

credit, toward more national and impersonal forms of consumer credit. It is argued that all of these factors tend to increase the incentives for filing bankruptcy
or reduce the constraints imposed on filing bankruptcy. The result has been to
increase the equilibrium level of bankruptcy filings in America.
Finally, the article briefly discusses some policy implications of the model presented here, focusing most specifically on the proposals contained in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act that Congress is again considering, but also addressing more farreaching proposals, such efforts to reverse changes in social norms or proposals
to allow contracting-around the mandatory discharge provision of current law.
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ABSTRACT
Consumer bankruptcy filing rates have soared during the past 25 years. From
225,000 filings in 1979, consumer bankruptcies topped 1.5 million during 2004. This
relentless upward trend is striking in light of the generally high prosperity, low interest
rates, and low unemployment during that period. This anomaly of ever-upward
bankruptcy filing rates during a period of economic prosperity had spurred calls to reform
the Bankruptcy Code to place new conditions on bankruptcy relief. Although bankruptcy
reform has drawn broad bipartisan support on Capitol Hill, these proposals have proven
controversial within the academy. Critics have argued that these reforms are unnecessary
and punitive, and that private market adjustments such as higher interest rates and more
restrictive credit rationing are suitable policy responses.
Scholars have previously identified two models of the consumer bankruptcy
process, the traditional “distress” model and the economic “incentives” model. Neither,
however, can explain the observed bankruptcy filing patterns of recent decades. This
article offers a new model of consumer bankruptcy rooted in New Institutional
Economics that explains the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings as reflecting changes in
the institutions, incentives, and constraints surrounding the consumer bankruptcy filing
decision. It is argued that this new model of consumer bankruptcy that is both
theoretically and empirically superior to the traditional model.
This article identifies three institutional factors that can explain the observed rise
in bankruptcy filings over the past several decades: (1) A change in the relative economic
costs and benefits associated with filing bankruptcy; (2) A change in social norms
regarding bankruptcy; and (3) Changes in the nature of consumer credit, toward more
national and impersonal forms of consumer credit. It is argued that all of these factors
tend to increase the incentives for filing bankruptcy or reduce the constraints imposed on
filing bankruptcy. The result has been to increase the equilibrium level of bankruptcy
filings in America.
Finally, the article briefly discusses some policy implications of the model
presented here, focusing most specifically on the proposals contained in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act that Congress is again considering, but also addressing more far-reaching
proposals, such efforts to reverse changes in social norms or proposals to allow
contracting-around the mandatory discharge provision of current law.
JEL Codes: D02, D10, D11, D12, D14, K00
Keywords: Consumer Bankruptcy, Consumer Finance, New Institutional Economics

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

INSTITUTIONS, INCENTIVES, AND CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY
*
BY TODD J. ZYWICKI
Consumer bankruptcy filing rates have soared during the past 25 years. From
225,000 filings in 1979, consumer bankruptcies topped 1.5 million last year.

This

relentless upward trend is especially striking given in light of generally high prosperity,
low interest rates, and low unemployment during that period. This anomaly of everupward bankruptcy filing rates during a period of relative prosperity had spurred repeated
calls over the past several years to reform the Bankruptcy Code to place new conditions
on bankruptcy relief. Although bankruptcy reform has drawn broad bipartisan support on
Capitol Hill, these proposals have proven controversial within the academy and
enactment of the legislation has proven elusive. Critics have argued that these reforms
are unnecessary and punitive in light of their understanding of the causes of the
bankruptcy crisis.
Critics of reform argue that consumer bankruptcy filings today are caused by the
same basic forces that traditionally have caused bankruptcy filings—heavy household
distress caused by overindebtedness, often combined with unexpected income or expense
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shocks, such as unemployment, divorce, or health problems. Although this “traditional
model” of consumer bankruptcy explained the world tolerably well for several decades, it
cannot explain the upward trend in bankruptcy filing rates over the past 25 years.1
Individuals increasingly appear to be choosing to file bankruptcy as a response to
financial distress, rather than reducing spending or tapping savings to avoid bankruptcy.
Other scholars have advanced a second approach, an “economic incentives”
model that the views the consumer bankruptcy filing decision as a direct and predictable
response to the incentives provided by the bankruptcy law. As will be seen, neither the
traditional model nor the economic maximization model can explained the observed
pattern of bankruptcy filings. The observed rate is much higher than the traditional
model would predict, and much lower than the economic maximization model predicts.
Moreover, neither model can explain the dynamic upward trend in filing patterns over
time.
Critiquing the prevailing models is insufficient, however; it is essential to offer an
alternative model that better explains the observed data.2 This article provides a new
model of consumer bankruptcy that can explain the trends of the past twenty-five years
more persuasively than the prevailing models. The model offered here is anchored in the
New Institutional Economics, associated with scholars such as Nobel Laureate Douglass
North and Oliver Williamson.

The model offered here sees the rising consumer

bankruptcy rate as reflecting an increasing tendency for individuals to choose bankruptcy
as the response to financial problems. In turn, the increased frequency of this choice
1

See Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, ___ NORTHWESTERN L.
REV. ___ (Forthcoming 2005).
2
As Kuhn observes, the test of a new theory is whether it explains the observed evidence better than the
prevailing model or “paradigm.” See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 77 (2d
ed. 1970).
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reflects changes in the institutions and incentives that have led Americans increasingly to
choose bankruptcy in response to financial distress.
This article identifies three institutional changes that have contributed to the
increase in consumer bankruptcies over the past few decades. First, there has been a
change in the relative economic costs and benefits associated with filing bankruptcy. The
economic benefits of bankruptcy have increased because of the adoption of the 1978
Bankruptcy Code. At the same time, the costs associated with filing bankruptcy have
fallen, such as reductions in the transaction and search costs associated with learning
about and filing bankruptcy. Second, there has been a change in social norms regarding
bankruptcy, reducing the shame and stigma that traditionally constrained bankruptcy
filings.3 Third, there has been a fundamental change in the nature of consumer credit in
the economy, which has expanded the use of general unsecured consumer credit in the
economy and reduced its use of traditional local and informal types of credit. This
evolution has increased the relative use of unsecured revolving consumer credit that is
dischargeable in bankruptcy as well as eroding many of the informal constraints that
restrained bankruptcy filings, such as trust, repeat-dealing, and the effects of reputation.
Ironically, those who have argued that the expansion of credit card use has contributed to
rising bankruptcy filings may be correct—but for the wrong reason. Credit cards have
not increased overall indebtedness and household financial distress, as is generally
assumed, but consumers have simply substituted credit cards and other modern forms of
unsecured credit for other types of credit, thereby leaving total consumer debt levels

3

I have elsewhere distinguished these terms: “Personal shame and social stigma go hand-in-hand. Shame
is the internal psychological compass that forces one to keep his word; stigma is the external, social
constraint that reinforces this.” Edith H. Jones & Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means-Testing, 1999
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY L. REV. 177, 215 (1999).
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largely unaffected. By substituting more impersonal forms of credit for more localized
retail and similar debt, however, this evolution has weakened the traditional extralegal
checks on bankruptcy filings. It is argued that this new model of consumer bankruptcy is
both theoretically and empirically superior to the traditional model.
The article then briefly discusses some policy implications of the model described
here.4 First, the analysis presented here provides a conceptual justification for many of
the key elements of the recent bankruptcy reform agenda, which are designed to modify
the incentives and institutions surrounding consumer bankruptcy. Just as the traditional
model manifested itself in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the new model of consumer
bankruptcy is consistent with much of the current bankruptcy reform agenda in recent
years.5 In that sense, this article is the first to provide a comprehensive conceptual
explanation for the bankruptcy reform movement. Ironically, it appears that policymakers may have recognized what most bankruptcy scholars have not yet—that we live
in a fundamentally new world of consumer bankruptcy.
Finally, the model presented here raises new questions about the scope of the
American fresh-start policy in American bankruptcy law. In particular, by showing that
the bankruptcy decision is to some extent under the control of the debtor, and that this
choice is based on unobservable information such as personal commitment to repayment
of financial obligations, the analysis presented here raises new questions about the
mandatory fresh-start policy embedded in American consumer bankruptcy law.
4

These policy implications are discussed in greater detail in a subsequent article. See Todd J. Zywicki,
Bankruptcy Reform: An Economic Analysis (working paper).
5
See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S.B. 256, introduced January
30, 2005. This bill is the fourth consecutive Congress in which comprehensive bankruptcy reform
legislation has been introduced. This bill is substantially similar in all relevant ways to earlier versions of
the same legislation from earlier Congresses. As a result, when this article refers to “bankruptcy reform
legislation” it intends to reference the entire course of these bills, rather than specifically the most recent
version.
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I.

New Institutional Economics and Consumer Bankruptcy

Consumer bankruptcy filing rates are usually explained according to two different
models.6 The first model, which I have labeled the “traditional model” (and which others
have labeled the “distress” model), views consumer bankruptcies as arising from
household financial distress. Under this model, higher bankruptcy filings are predicted to
be caused by higher levels of household financial distress. The second model, variously
called the “economic” maximization or “incentives” model, views consumer bankruptcy
filings as a direct and predictable response to the economic incentives provided by the
Bankruptcy Code. As the Code increases the benefits of filing bankruptcy, it is predicted
that more consumers will file bankruptcy. Neither can explain the consumer bankruptcy
filing patters of recent years.
For most of the Twentieth Century, consumer bankruptcy filings followed a
relatively predictable pattern, rising in times of economic recessions (peaking at the
height of the Great Depression) but then falling to a low, steady-state rate after the
economic crisis abated. Beginning in the 1950s, however, consumer bankruptcy filings
have started to trend gradually upward. Beginning in the 1980s, bankruptcy filing rates
rose more rapidly, and began to rise dramatically during the 1990s. After a brief dip at
the end of the 1990s, bankruptcies have surged upward in the new century, reaching 1.5
million in 2004. These trends are shown in Figure 1:

6

See Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and State Collections: The Case of the Missing Garnishments
(working paper). Hynes refers to these as the “distress” and “incentives” model. Others have characterized
them as “sociological” and “economic” models. See Michelle J. White, Economic Versus Sociological
Approaches to Legal Research: The Case of Bankruptcy, 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 685 (1991).
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Figure 1: Bankruptcy Filings, 1945-2003
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This upward trend in filing rates has come during a period of unprecedented economic
prosperity. The experience of the 1990s is especially striking, in that bankruptcies surged
in the face of low unemployment, low interest rates, and record-high wealth accumulation
due to gains in the stock market and household real estate holdings.
The evidence indicates that the rise in consumer bankruptcy filing rates is the
result not of greater economic distress, as the traditional model would predict, but rather,
from an increasing propensity of American households to file bankruptcy in response to
economic problems.7 In the past, households that suffered an economic dislocation
tended to respond by reducing spending, tapping savings, taking a second job, and
eventually repaying their obligations. Although many Americans today still respond to
financial distress in the same way, an increasing number are filing bankruptcy and
7

See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1.
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discharging their debts instead. What is novel, are not the underlying problems, but
rather, the increasing frequency of Americans choosing bankruptcy as a response to those
underlying problems.
The fundamental problem with the traditional model is that it conflates two
conceptually distinct questions: first, how families get in to financial distress in the first
place and second, how they come to choose to get out of financial distress. Financial
difficulty presents a menu of options in addition to bankruptcy, from increasing one’s
income (such as by taking on a second job), decreasing one’s expenditures (such as by
eating out less or vacationing less), or by liquidating assets and using the proceeds to pay
debts (such as moving to a smaller house).
On the other hand, adherents to the economic maximization model have found a
substantial difference between the bankruptcy filing rates that would be predicted to
result from simple consumer maximizing behavior and what is actually observed in
practice.8 Estimates are as much as 15-33% of Americans would financially benefit from
filing bankruptcy; in practice, however, only a small fraction actually do so.9 Moreover,
it is argued that although the 1978 Code increased the incentives to file bankruptcy, it did
not change the law so dramatically as to explain the subsequent jump in bankruptcy filing
rates. This gap suggests that there must be some sort of extralegal mediating institutions
that are not captured in the neoclassical economic model. Moreover, in order to explain
how changes in these factors have driven changes in bankruptcy filing rates it is
necessary for these factors to be dynamic, not static. They must be capable of explaining
8

See Michelle J. White, Why Don’t More Households File for Bankruptcy?, 14 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 205
(1998). In addition, as Richard Hynes finds, there also appears to be substantial stability in non-bankruptcy
debt collection rules that have traditionally been thought to lead to bankruptcy, such as garnishment. See
Hynes, Missing Garnishments, supra note 6.
9
See discussion infra at note 20 and accompanying text.
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change over time. Given the absence of any significant amendments to the Bankruptcy
Code during the past 20 years, it is difficult to see how the economic incentives model,
standing alone, can explain a 500% increase in bankruptcy filings during that period.
This suggests that there must be some sort of mediating institutional influences that are
not captured in the incentives-based economic model.
Both the traditional and economic maximization models, therefore, suffer from a
common limitation—the both fail to account for the complexity of the individual
bankruptcy filing decision and the institutional framework that surrounds it.
Understanding the bankruptcy filing decision requires an examination of the consumer
bankruptcy institutions that provide the incentives and constraints on filing bankruptcy,
not the factors that cause the underlying financial distress.10
In the New Institutional Economics (NIE) framework, institutions serve two
functions: they provide incentives and they provide a transactional framework.11 First,
institutions provide incentives by channeling individual behavior in particular directions.
For instance, criminal law is an institution that provides incentives to acquire property by
consensual exchange rather than by theft, channeling behavior toward wealth-creation
and peaceful exchange of property.

Second, institutions provide a transactional

framework, such as rules of property and contract that instruct people on how to
coordinate their affairs so as to accomplish their plans. Contract law, for instance,
instructs people on how to enter into enforceable exchanges of entitlements; property law
10

Douglass North has defined an “institution” as: “[T]he humanly devised constraints that structure human
interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (e.g. rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints
(e.g. norms of behavior, conventions, self-imposed codes-of-conduct), and their enforcement
characteristics. Together, they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically economies.” See
Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AMER. ECON. REV. 359, 360 (1994).
11
See DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 27
(1990).
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instructs people on how to protect their property from the claims of others. Institutions
can be formal or informal. Criminal law is an institution, but so is morality and social
norms, which also constrain antisocial behavior. Contract law is an institution, but so is
the development of a reputation or trademark that also encourages the performance of
promises even where contract enforcement is lacking.12

Thus, institutions provide

incentives, but they need not be consciously designed for that purpose, nor are they
necessarily under conscious design and control.
This article discusses the institutional changes that have increased the propensity
of Americans to file bankruptcy in recent years. Three general factors appear to have
driven the increase in bankruptcy filing rates in recent years: (1) Changes in the relative
economic costs and benefits of filing bankruptcy; (2) A change in the social norms
regarding bankruptcy; and (3) Changes in the nature of consumer credit that have led to
an increased willingness of borrowers at the margin to discharge their obligations in
bankruptcy. Each factor tends to push in the direction of increasing filings. This article
also review the available empirical evidence, which tends to support the model advanced
here.13 It is hoped that by identifying the relevant factors that may be help to explain the
bankruptcy boom this will help to elicit better empirical testing in the future.

II.

Changes in the Relative Benefits and Costs of Filing Bankruptcy

12

See Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual
Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
13
Most prevision empirical study has been grounded in the traditional model of bankruptcy, and thus does
not focus on the factors identified here. Professor Robert Chapman has observed that statistical analysis of
bankruptcy, as with all science, is heavily dependent on externally chosen assumptions about conceptual
categories and causal relationships. See Robert B. Chapman, Missing Persons: Social Science and
Accounting for Race, Gender, Class, and Marriage in Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 347, 397-98 (2002).
Chapman notes that statistics, “Both depend on and create a view of the world.” Id. at 397.
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The first factor that has contributed to increasing consumer bankruptcies is a
change in the relative benefits and costs associated with filing bankruptcy. In the past
twenty-five years, there simultaneously have been increases in the economic benefits and
reductions in the economic costs of filing bankruptcy.14 These changes in the relative
costs and benefits associated with declaring bankruptcy create incentives at the margin to
file bankruptcy that are reflected in the increasing bankruptcy filing rates of recent
decades.
A.

The Economic Benefits of Filing Bankruptcy Have Risen
1.

The 1978 Code Increased the Economic Benefits of Filing Bankruptcy

It is generally accepted that the economic benefits to an individual from filing
bankruptcy increased with the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code; the primary
points of disagreement has been the extent to which consumers have responded to these
changed incentives from an economically rational perspective and whether this change
has been good or bad overall from a normative perspective.15 Although the evidence of

14

One could also consider reduced stigma as a reduction in the social “cost” of filing bankruptcy. See
Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1063 (1974); see also Note, A Reformed
Economic Model of Consumer Bankruptcy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1338, 1347 (1996). For purposes of
exposition, in this Part of the article I have focused on more tangible and direct economic costs and
discuss the effects of reduced social stigma separately, although those factors could be classified as a
relevant “cost” of bankruptcy if one were so inclined to treat it that way.
15
Professor William Whitford has observed “it is hard to believe that the enactment of the Code has not
had any effect on bankruptcy filing rates.” William C. Whitford, The Ideal of Individualized Justice:
Consumer Bankruptcy as Consumer Protection, and Consumer Protection in Consumer Bankruptcy, 68
AM. BANKR. L. J. 397, 399 n.11 (1994). He adds, “It is indisputable that consumers can often achieve
better economic results through bankruptcy today than they would have been able to achieve if the law
had not been changed. To assume that this change has had no effect on decisions to file, one would have
to make monumental changes in the usual assumptions about the responsiveness of humans to financial
incentives in commercial matters.” Id. Summaries of some of the major pro-debtor changes ushered in by
the 1978 Code can be found in Ian Domowitz and Robert L. Sartain, Incentives and Bankruptcy Chapter
Choice: Evidence form the Reform Act of 1978, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 467 (1999); Charles Jordan Tabb,
The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 34-37 (1995);
Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 275, 275-97
(1980). In congressional testimony, the American Bankruptcy Institute acknowledged that the 1978 Code
“made bankruptcy a much more debtor-friendly law.” See Personal Bankruptcy Consumer Credit Crises:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th
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an increased filing effect is somewhat mixed, most scholars conclude that the enactment
of the Code did have some effect of increasing bankruptcy filings at the margin, although
the changes from previous law were not large enough to account for all of the subsequent
rise in filings.16
As originally enacted, the 1978 Bankruptcy Code placed few restrictions on a
debtor’s ability to file bankruptcy, regardless of the debtor’s need for bankruptcy relief or
ability to repay her debts. The motivation of the drafters of the 1978 Code for doing this
is somewhat unclear, but it seems that they believed that legal restraints on debtor
opportunism were unnecessary and that social and economic constraints would be
sufficient to prevent opportunistic use of the bankruptcy system by debtors.17 Whatever
the rationale, the Legislative History to the 1978 Code states, “The section does not
contemplate . . . that the ability of the debtor to repay his debts in whole or in part
constitutes adequate cause for dismissal.”18 Nor is insolvency required before filing.
Concerned by an immediate surge in bankruptcy filings following the enactment
of the 1978 Code, in 1984 Congress amended the Code to place some modest limits on
Cong., 1st Sess. (April 11, 1997) (Statement of the American Bankruptcy Institute), available in 1997 WL
176645 at 7.
16
Most commentators have concluded that the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code has caused some
increase in the bankruptcy filing rate. See F.H. Buckley, The American Fresh Start, 4 S. CAL.
INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 67, 76-77 (1995); Lawrence Shepard, Personal Failures and the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 27 J. L. & ECON. 419 (1984); Richard L. Peterson and Kiyomi Aoki, Bankruptcy
Filings Before and After Implementation of the Bankruptcy Reform Law, 36 J. ECON. & BUS. 95 (1995);
William J. Boyes and Roger L. Faith, Some Effects of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 29 J. L. &
ECON. 139; William T. Vukowich, Reforming the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: An Alternative
Approach, 71 GEO. L.J. 1129 (1983). Other studies failed to detect a significant increase in filing rates as
a result of the 1978. See Jagdeep S. Bhandari and Lawrence A. Weiss, The Increasing Bankruptcy Filing
Rate: An Historical Analysis, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (1993); Ian Domowitz and Thomas L. Eovaldi, The
Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on Consumer Bankruptcy, 36 J. L. & ECON. 803 (1993). For
a criticism of the statistical methods used in these latter two studies, see F.H. Buckley & Margaret F.
Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 194 n.17.
17
See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 131-160
(2002),
18
Legislative History to 11 U.S.C. §707(b). For a discussion of the political developments that led to the
emergence of §707(b), see SKEEL, supra note 17, at 196-97.
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the ability of consumers who file bankruptcy opportunistically. In particular, the 1984
amendments added §707(b) to the Code, empowering bankruptcy judges to dismiss a
debtor’s bankruptcy case if granting relief would amount to a “substantial abuse” of the
bankruptcy system.

In practice, however, this power has been used only rarely,

sporadically, and inconsistently to police debtor opportunism.19 Thus, §707(b) has done
little in practice to reduce the economic benefits associated with filing bankruptcy, even
for those with high repayment capacity.
It has been estimated by one scholar that with a modest degree of pre-bankruptcy
planning as much as one-third of American households could gain financially from filing
bankruptcy and the financial benefit from filing is greatest for well-off debtors.20
Calculation of the economic benefits from filing bankruptcy also partially explains
debtors’ choices between Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.21

Overall, there appears to be

substantial economic benefits from filing bankruptcy for many people.
But bankruptcy does not merely give a debtor the opportunity to discharge
financial obligations. There are also intangible benefits associated with filing bankruptcy
19

Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3; Todd J. Zywicki, With Apologies to Screwtape: A Response to
Professor Alexander, 9 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 613 (2000). Professor Jack Williams, for instance, has
described §707(b) as a “dismal failure” in preventing abuse. See Jack F. Williams, Distrust: The Rhetoric
and Reality of Means-Testing, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 105 (1998). See also Scott Fay, Erik Hurst,
& Michelle White, The Household Bankruptcy Decision, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 706, 707 n.4 (2002) (noting
that “later court decisions and lack of enforcement made [the substantial abuse provision] ineffective”);
Wayne R. Wells, Janell M. Kurtz, and Robert J. Calhoun, The Implementation of Bankruptcy Code Section
707(b): The Law and the Reality, 39 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 15 (1991); Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh
Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case of Narrow Construction of the Consumer Credit Amendments,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 59 (1986).
20
See Why It Pays to File for Bankruptcy: A Critical Look at Incentives Under U.S. Bankruptcy Laws and
a Proposal for Change, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 685 (1998); White, supra note 8, at 214 (concluding that a
minimum of 15% and as much as 23% of American population could financially benefit from filing
bankruptcy); Fay, Hurst, & White, supra note 19, at 712 (finding 18% of households in study would
benefit financially from filing bankruptcy).
21
See Domowitz and Sartain, Incentives and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice, supra note 15, at 481-82. For
instance, states with higher state exemption values appear to have higher rates of chapter 7 filings relative
to chapter 13 than those with lower exemptions. Higher exemption values permit debtors to retain more
property in chapter 7; thus, where exemption values are lower, filers must choose chapter 13 to retain
property.
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that are not found on a balance sheet. The initiation of a bankruptcy case imposes an
automatic stay against all efforts by creditors to collect prepetition debts.22 Indeed,
Professor Jean Braucher reports that the primary goal of bankruptcy filers is “stopping
creditors’ collection efforts (foreclosure, repossession, suit, garnishment, phone calls,
letters, home visits).”23

Second on the list is “keeping property, often serving as

collateral, such as homes, cars and household belongings.”24

Thus, bankruptcy

procedures such as the automatic stay provide additional economic benefit for filing
bankruptcy above and beyond the discharge itself.25
The substantial benefits provided by the current bankruptcy system essentially has
created a sort of arbitrage opportunity for many to gain financially by filing bankruptcy,
and the rising bankruptcy rates of recent years provides evidence that this arbitrage
opportunity is gradually being recognized and exploited by bankruptcy filers. The steady
upward trend in bankruptcy filing rates, rather than an immediate jump, is also consistent
with NIE theory. There are substantial information and transaction costs associated with
learning about and filing personal bankruptcy, which means that consumer response to
the existing arbitrage opportunity will tend to be gradual, rather than immediate, as
information percolates through the system. This will especially be the case for a rare and
relatively risky event such as the decision to file bankruptcy.
22

11 U.S.C. §362(a).
Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L. J.
501, 522 (1993).
24
Id.
25
See Sugato Chakravarty and Eun-Young Rhee, Factors Affecting an Individual’s Bankruptcy Filing
Decision, Working Paper, Purdue University (May 4, 1999) (reporting survey data that second-most
common reason for filing bankruptcy was in response to lawsuits and collection harassment); see also
“People Behind Bankruptcy Numbers: Preliminary Results of Chapter 13 Study in Progress,” Testimony
Before the Subcomm. On Admin. Oversight and the Court of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. At *6 (1998) (testimony of Professor Tahira K. Hira), available in 1998 WL 8992993 (reporting
results of survey of bankruptcy filers who state that “no more phone calls from creditors” is a leading
reason for filing bankruptcy).
23
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Economists have modeled the spread of knowledge of an economic opportunity as
following an S-shaped curve.26 At first an innovation is adopted only by those who have
a large amount to gain from the innovation and are willing to bear the risk of the
innovation, and so the spread of information is slow. But at some point the awareness of
the new higher-level equilibrium becomes apparent to others, and knowledge spreads
quickly through the economy until the new equilibrium level is reached. Where the gain
from adopting the new knowledge is high or the cost of adopting it is low, the knowledge
will be expected to spread more rapidly.27
In a pathbreaking article examining the diffusion of information through the
economy and society, economist Zvi Griliches modeled the spread of information
through the American farm belt of the development of high-yield hybrid corn during the
mid-Twentieth Century.28 When adopted, hybrid corn increased productivity by 300 to
1,000 per cent.29 Nonetheless, hybrid corn was not introduced immediately or at the
same time in all parts of the country. Rather, its introduction ranged from the mid-1930s
in Iowa to the mid-1940s in Alabama, with several intermediate states. Once introduced
into a region, however, the diffusion of knowledge of hybrid corn followed a nearlyidentical S-shaped curve in each area introduced, starting slow, then moving dramatically
upward before leveling off at a new higher equilibrium. Once the information was first
26

See Zvi Griliches, Hybrid Corn: An Exploration in the Economics of Technological Change, 25
ECONOMETRICA 501 (1957). See also Pauline M. Ippolito and Richard A. Ippolito, Measuring the Value of
Life Savings from Consumer Reactions to New Information, 25 J. PUB. ECON. 53 (1984); Richard A.
Ippolito, R. Dennis Murphy, and Donald Sant, Staff Report on Consumer Reponses to Cigarette Health
Information (Federal Trade Commission Staff Report, Aug. 1979) (observing gradual spread of knowledge
to consumers regarding health information about cigarettes).
27
Griliches, Hybrid Corn, supra note 26, at 522.
28
See id.; see also Zvi Griliches, Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn and Related
Innovations, 66 J. POL. ECON. 419 (1958). For a more modern application of Griliches’s model to
innovation activity see Michael R. Darby and Lynne G. Zucker, Grilichesian Breakthroughs: Inventions of
Methods of Inventing and Firm Entry in Nanotechnology, NBER Working Paper 9825, available in
http://www.nber.org/papers.w9825.
29
Griliches, Hybrid Corn, supra note 26, at 521 n.43.
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made available, Griliches observed, a predictable adjustment path followed that showed
some short-term variation, but which over time exhibited more or less uniform movement
toward a new equilibrium path.
It is interesting that Figure 1 above, which plots a curve of bankruptcy filing rates
over the past half century, resembles Griliches’s S-shaped curve of transmission of
information across the economy, rising gradually at first but then accelerating over time.
There appears to be a more or less consistent march to a higher equilibrium level of
consumer bankruptcy filings, such that at some point the curve will level off at a new
higher equilibrium level, whatever that may be. The new equilibrium has not yet been
reached, but the long-term trend line in bankruptcy filings is exhibiting a predictable rise
toward a new higher equilibrium level.
The Bankruptcy Code provides a type of economic profit opportunity because
many people could benefit financially by declaring bankruptcy. Bankruptcy filers can
protect substantial property through property exemptions. Moreover, because of the
property-based nature of bankruptcy exemptions, this benefit rises as household wealth
rises.30 Because a chapter 7 discharge protects future income from creditors, the value of
this benefit also rises as income rises.31 In other words, both high wealth and high
income households have the largest potential benefit from filing bankruptcy.

30

This is because rather than giving a general dollar allowance for exempt property, exemption regimes
enumerate specific exempt property that is thought necessary to the debtor’s fresh start, such as houses,
automobiles, and retirement plans. In practice, middle class families are more likely to own this sort of
property and have higher values than lower-income households, thus the property-based nature of the
exemption regime tends to favor upper-income debtors.
31
See 11 U.S.C. §541(a)(6). An individual’s future income stream constitutes the most valuable asset for
the overwhelming number of people. See Buckley, American Fresh Start, supra note 16, at 67; James
Davies and John Whally, Taxes and Capital Formation: How Important is Human Capital?, NBER
Working Paper No. 2899 (1989).
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But individuals with large amounts of debt will also benefit from filing
bankruptcy. The greater the amount of household debt, the greater will be the benefit of
being able to discharge debt.

In fact, there is an observable correlation between

household debt levels and consumer bankruptcy filings.32 Adherents to the traditional
model have assumed that this correlation implies a determinate causal direction, and have
posited that consumer debt is an exogenous variable that causes bankruptcy filings as an
endogenous variable. But the causal link more plausibly runs the other way. It is
unlikely that debt levels are chosen wholly exogenously by consumers; rather, debt levels
are partly endogenous, reflecting the ease with which these obligations can be discharged
in bankruptcy.33

In turn, high levels of household debt increase the economic benefit of

filing bankruptcy by permitting the discharge of more debt.34

As total debt rises,

bankruptcy becomes more attractive, because it increases the benefit received from a
bankruptcy discharge. The benefits rise still further in a system like the American
bankruptcy system, which permits bankruptcy filers to pick and choose which debts they
want to pay, providing the option, for instance, to reaffirm some debts (such as mortgages
and car loans) but to discharge others (such as credit cards).35 If causation ran in the
direction postulated by the traditional model, then the correlation between debt and
bankruptcy should also be reflected in more conventional measures of indebtedness, such

32

See Robert M. Lawless, The Relationship Between Nonbusiness Bankruptcy Filings and Various Basic
Measures
of
Consumer
Debt,
available
in
http://www.law.unlv.edu/faculty/rlawless/busbkr/body_filings.htm at 9. The relationship between total
debt and bankruptcy filings is similar. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION,
Chapter 1, p. 85 (1996).
33
See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1.
34
See Chakravarty and Rhee, supra note 25, at 12 (finding increase in likelihood of individual filing
bankruptcy as benefit rises, as measured in terms of dollar amount of debts discharged under bankruptcy
protection net of non-exempt property).
35
See Scott F. Norberg, Consumer Bankruptcy’s New Clothes: An Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt
Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415 (1999).
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as the debt-service ratio and balance sheet insolvency, which account for factors such as
interest rates and household assets. But it is not. 36 The correlation between debt and
bankruptcy is apparent, but the causal explanation proposed by the traditional model
appears to be incorrect.
The assertion of the traditional model, that consumer debt provides a causal
explanation of the bankruptcy filing rate, is a classic manifestation of the ex post ergo
propter hoc fallacy37—namely, that the observed correlation supports the asserted causal
relationship. But there is no a priori reason to assume that causation runs in the direction
assumed by the traditional model, nor is there corroborating empirical evidence to
support this causal inference.

The correlation between total debt and bankruptcy,

therefore, is more plausibly attributed to the increased benefit that this provides for
highly-indebted consumers to file bankruptcy to gain the relief of the bankruptcy
discharge. Reducing the benefits of bankruptcy, therefore, probably would decrease both
household debt levels and bankruptcy filings.
2.

The Role of Property Exemptions

At the same time, the 1978 Code enlarged one of the more important benefits
governing bankruptcy filings, the structure of property exemptions in bankruptcy.38
Exemptions govern the amount of property, and what types of property, a debtor can
retain when she files bankruptcy. Moreover, exemption law has traditionally been a
creature of state law, rather than federal law. The 1978 Code, however, added an
additional slate of federal exemptions, giving filers a choice of exemption regimes,
36

See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1.
See James Tobin, Money and Income: Post Hoc Ergo Propter Hoc? 84 Q. J. ECON. 301, 302-03 (1970)
(discussing perils of inferring determinate causal relationships from correlations).
38
See Barry Adler, Ben Polak, and Alan Schwartz, Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical
Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 608-09 (2000).
37
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except in states that have opted-out of the federal menu and require debtors to use the
state exemption regime instead.39 The Code therefore left unaffected the exemption
regimes in place for filers in opt-out states, but increased the benefits for those filers who
now have a choice between the state and federal slates of exemptions.
State variation in exemptions means that the relative economic benefits accruing
to debtors from filing bankruptcy will vary across the country.40 Debtors in states with
more generous exemption law regimes will be able to keep more property in bankruptcy
than those in states with less generous exemption laws. As a result, debtors living in
more generous exemption states will have a greater incentive at the margin to file
bankruptcy relative to debtors living in less-generous exemption states. There is some
empirical evidence that individuals do respond to these incentives, and that more
generous exemption laws lead to increased bankruptcy filings at the margin.41 Moreover,
there appears to have been a tendency for property exemptions to rise in recent years,
both by a steady increase in the dollar value of exemptions (several states have created
homestead exemptions or increased the cap on their homestead exemptions in recent
years), as well as through the creation and recognition of new categories of exempt
property, especially new or expanded exemptions for retirement accounts.42

39

11 U.S.C. §522.
See Eric A. Posner, Richard Hynes, and Anup Malani, The Political Economy of Property Exemption
Laws, 47 J. L. & ECON. 19 (2004).
41
See White, Why It Pays to File, supra note 20, at 685. On the other hand, although the impact of
exemptions is positive, it appears to be modest in magnitude, probably because residents of highexemption states generally have less access to credit ex ante, which dampens some of direct benefit of
filing. See Note, Reformed Economic, supra note 14, at 1347 (1996) (summarizing studies); Kartik
Athreya, Fresh Start or Head Start? Uniform Bankruptcy Exemptions and Welfare (working paper, Aug.
12, 2003); see also Reint Gropp, John Karl Scholz, and Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy and
Credit Supply and Demand, 112 Q. J. ECON. 217 (1997) (finding that credit is more expensive and less
available in high-exemption states).
42
For a comprehensive survey of state policies related to exemptions, see C. Scott Pryor, Rock, Scissors,
Paper: ERISA, The Bankruptcy Code and State Exemption Laws for Individual Retirement Accounts, 77
AM. BANKR. L. J. 65 (2003).
40
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This expansion in exemptions may explain some of the increase in consumer
bankruptcy filings, especially when combined with other developments.

Household

wealth and household bankruptcies have both increased dramatically during the past few
decades. Household wealth has exploded, going through several periods of rapid wealth
accumulation.43

In fact, after remaining relatively stable for over half a century,

household net wealth began to rise rapidly in the 1970s, accelerated in the 1908s, and
exploded in the 1990s. At the same time, consumer bankruptcy filings also rose steadily
and dramatically during that same time. In the mid-1990s, for example, household net
wealth grew by about ten percent per year, even as consumer bankruptcies jumped as
much as twenty percent per year. Moreover, the ratio of consumer credit to household
net worth has remained almost perfectly constant at four percent of net worth since
1956.44 This combination of rising bankruptcies and rising personal wealth contradicts
the hypothesis that mounting bankruptcies reflects increased household financial distress,
but is consistent with the view that consumers can shield more wealth in bankruptcy. The
sources of the rise in net wealth have varied over time, but in general, there have been
large rises in the value of residential real estate (throughout the period) and financial
assets (especially during the stock market boom of the 1990s).45
The steady increase in home property values over the past thirty years has
increased the effective of the homestead exemption by increasing the amount of wealth
43

See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1.
See Thomas A. Durkin, in THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON CONSUMER CREDIT at 35, 40 and 40, Fig. 4
(Thomas A. Durkin and Michael E. Staten eds., 2001). Not coincidentally, this ratio is also consistent with
the long run estimated marginal propensity to consume out of household wealth, which has been stable
between 3-5% for many years. See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1.
45
See Joanna H. Frodin, Commentary: Is the Savings Rate Really Negative?,
http://www.phil.frb.org/src/specialstudies/cfarticle1.html (identifying three distinct consumer wealth
“booms” over past 30 years); William G. Gale & John Sabelhaus, Perspectives on the Household Saving
Rate, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 181, 200-02 (William C. Brainerd and George L.
Perry eds., 1999).
44
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available to be protected in bankruptcy. Some cases involving homestead exemptions
have been quite egregious, allowing debtors to pour massive amounts of wealth into a
homestead exempt in bankruptcy, often on the eve of bankruptcy.46 In practice, however,
the impact of the unlimited homestead exemption on bankruptcy filings is relatively
trivial. Fay, Hurst, and White, for instance, conclude that were a cap of $100,000 to be
imposed on the amount of equity one could protect in a homestead, this would reduce
bankruptcy filings only about 6,000 per year (out of 1.5 million).47 The reason for this is
obvious—few bankruptcy filers have more than $100,000 in equity in their homes. On
the other hand, the aggregate effect of all homestead exemptions across the country is
significant.48
The increase in wealth from the increased value in financial assets also has
increased the effective value of bankruptcy-exempt retirement plans.49 Although there is
little systematic empirical evidence on the effect of more generous treatment of
retirement savings on bankruptcy filing rates, anecdotal evidence through case filings
suggest that it is becoming increasingly common for bankruptcy filers to have substantial
amounts of excepted or exempt pension plans at the time of filing bankruptcy. One
Bankruptcy Judge observed in a case a few years ago, “[N]otwithstanding that many
debtors have such substantial unsecured consumer debt, few seem to own (or report) any
significant non-exempt tangible personal property, but many report substantial exempt

46

See GAO Finds Some Florida and Texas Debtors Have Expensive Homes, CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS,
Aug. 12, 1999, at 1, 6; Protecting Rich Bankrupts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1999, at A-20.
47
Fay, Hurst, and White, supra note 19, at 715-16.
48
See Andreas Lehnert & Dean M. Maki, Consumption, Debt, and Portfolio Choice: Testing the Effect of
Bankruptcy Law at 31, Federal Reserve Board (Working paper, Feb. 2002) (concluding that reducing all
state homestead exemptions to average level of lowest quartile of states would be predicted to reduce
filings by 18%).
49
See 11 U.S.C. §510(c); Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
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retirement funds (IRA, 401K or Keough accounts).”50 In that case, for instance, one of
the debtors was a successful doctor who had amassed interests in IRA, ERISA, Keough,
and other exempt pension plans of over $390,000, and nonetheless sought relief in
Chapter 7.51 The Bankruptcy Court took the debtor’s large exempt pension assets into
account in dismissing the case for substantial abuse, a decision that was later affirmed by
the Second Circuit.52 Other cases have involved Chapter 7 debtors who had accumulated
$200,000,53 $285,000,54 and $96,00055 in exempt pension plans that were either excepted
or exempt in bankruptcy. In another case, a doctor filed bankruptcy after being sued for
$160 million in damages from the debtor’s intentional sexual abuse. The debtor proposed
a Chapter 13 plan to pay them $45,000 over a five-year plan period. At the same time, he
held three exempt IRA accounts with a total value of $1.4 million. The court held that
debtor was not required to include any of the $1.4 million or income derived from it in
his “disposable income” for purposes of his plan payment obligations.56

This

combination of rising financial assets and expanding exemptions for retirement plans has
increased the financial benefit of filing bankruptcy, especially for wealthier debtors.
B.

The Economic Costs of Filing Bankruptcy Have Fallen
The economic costs of learning about and filing bankruptcy also have fallen over

time, thereby increasing bankruptcies.

This cost reduction has taken a number of

different forms, including reductions in the search costs of learning about bankruptcy and
50

In re Carlton, 211 B.R. 468, 475 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y., 1997).
Carlton, 211 B.R. at 468.
52
Kornfield v. Schwartz, 164 F.3d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that even though the pension plan was
exempt property, the Bankruptcy Court acted within its discretion in considering it under the totality of the
circumstances test for substantial abuse).
53
In re Summer, 255 B.R. 555, 558 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio, 2000).
54
In re Dabbas, 2000 WL 33672948 (Bankr. D. Utah, Aug. 24, 2000). The court made no mention of the
pension in dismissing the case for substantial abuse.
55
In re Haddad, 246 B.R. 27, 35 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 2000).
56
Solomon v. Cosby, 67 F.3d 1128 (4th Cir. 1995)
51
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the transaction costs of filing bankruptcy. At the same time, increases in the availability
of sub-prime and home equity secured lending have reduced the costs of obtaining credit
following bankruptcy. These various reductions in the costs of filing bankruptcy have
also increased incentives at the margin toward higher bankruptcy filing rates. Given the
substantial economic benefits available to bankruptcy filers, even a small decline in the
relative costs of filing bankruptcy could be expected to elicit a substantial increase in the
number of bankruptcy filings.57
It should be stressed at the outset that a decline in search and transaction costs for
filing bankruptcy is a good thing from an economic perspective, even though it increases
bankruptcy filings. The relevant policy concern is not the total number of bankruptcy
filings per se, but rather an efficient level of bankruptcy filings that accurately matches
actual bankruptcy filings with those who society determines should be entitled to
bankruptcy relief, while limiting fraud and abuse. Rationing access by high search and
transaction costs, therefore, furthers no coherent or persuasive goal as a matter of social
policy. Leaving aside the normative question of where to draw this line between access
and minimizing abuse, it is first necessary to understand as a positive question how
reduced search and transaction costs translate into increased bankruptcy filings.
1.

Declining Search Costs

As noted, bankruptcy relief can be extremely beneficial to many of those who file,
and many American families could benefit financially by filing bankruptcy. But there are
also costs associated with pursuing bankruptcy. Most notably, debtors must become
aware of bankruptcy as an option and the benefits it provides. Because information about

57

See David B. Gross & Nicholas S. Souleles, An Empirical Analysis of Personal Bankruptcy and
Delinquency, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 319, 320 (2002).
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the benefits of bankruptcy is not free, a debtor must undertake some effort to learn about
bankruptcy and to educate herself about the benefits of bankruptcy before filing. In
economics, this concept is referred to as “search costs.” As the search costs of learning
about bankruptcy relief fall debtors will tend to increase their demand for bankruptcy,
thereby increasing the number of bankruptcies. Today individuals receive information
about bankruptcy from a large variety of sources: attorney advertising, celebrity reports,
and from friends and family, all of which suggests that the search costs of bankruptcy
have fallen in recent years.
Attorney advertising about bankruptcy is much more widespread than in the
past.58 There is some evidence that the extent of attorney advertising of bankruptcy
services is correlated with the number of bankruptcy filings in the relevant community,
but the direction of the causal influence is ambiguous.59 On the other hand, there is
ample empirical evidence that in general attorney advertising tends to increase the
demand for lawyers’ services.60

There is no reason to believe that demand for

bankruptcy would be inconsistent with this general model, which suggests that
58

Coincidentally, at almost the same time the Code was amended, the Supreme Court held that attorney
advertising is commercial speech protected by the First Amendment, thereby legalizing attorney
advertising. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
59
SMR Research “did a brief study of telephone book ads and found that cities with high bankruptcy filing
rates usually do have higher levels of lawyer advertising than cities with low filing rates.” See The Rise in
Personal Bankruptcy: Causes and Impact, Before the Subcomm. On Commercial and Admin. Law of the
House Comm. On the Judiciary, 105th Cong. At *18-19 (1998) (testimony of Stuart A. Feldstein, President
of SMR Research), available in 1998 WL 105080. The causal link is ambiguous, however, because it is
not clear whether these lawyers are responding to extant demand for attorney services to file bankruptcy,
creating demand for bankruptcy filings through informative advertising, or both.
60
See WILLIAM J. JACOBS, ET AL., IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL SERVICES: THE CASE FOR
REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING 172 FTC Staff Report (1984); Terry Calvani,
James Lagenfeld, & Gordon Shuford, Attorney Advertising and Competition at the Bar, 41 VAND. L. REV.
761 (1988); John Schroeter, Scott Smith, and Steven Cox, Advertising and Competition in Routine Legal
Service Markets: An Empirical Investigation, 35 J. INDUS. ECON. 49 (1987); Timothy J. Muris & Fred
McChesney, Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Services, 1979 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J.
179 (1979); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Russell G. Pearce, and Jeffrey W. Stempel, Why Lawyers Should be
Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 NYU L. REV. 1058 (1983); see also
George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961); Lester G. Telser,
Advertising and Competition, 72 J. POL ECON. 537 (1964).
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advertising generates increased bankruptcies.61 Figure 2 is suggestive of a relationship
between bankruptcy filings and advertising for legal services:

Figure 2: Bankruptcy Filings and Attorney Advertising
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Figure 2 does not purport to demonstrate a correlation between bankruptcy filing rates
and attorney advertising, but in the absence of systematic data on the scale of attorney
advertising, this may be illustrative of the level of information available to consumers
through advertising.62 On that basis, at least, it seems that there is some ground for

61

A study by Visa reported that 19% of bankruptcy filers learned about bankruptcy through attorney
advertisements. See Vern McKinley, Ballooning Bankruptcies: Issuing Blame for the Explosive Growth,
Regulation, Fall 1997, at 33, 38.
62
There are a number of qualifications to Figure 2 that should be noted. First, the amount of money spent
on attorney advertising is for all legal services, not just personal bankruptcy services. Nonetheless, casual
empiricism suggests that personal bankruptcy is one of the more heavily-advertised forms of legal services,
especially on television. Second, these figures represent only expenditures on television advertising, and
therefore do not reflect amounts spent on other forms of media, such as radio, print, the Yellow Pages, and
Internet. On the other hand, personal bankruptcy advertisements are represented in those media as well,
seemingly at least to the same extent as on television, and perhaps more. Third, the causal link is
indeterminate—increased attorney advertising may be a reflection of increased bankruptcy filings, rather
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encouraging further research regarding the empirical relationship between attorney
advertising and consumer bankruptcy filings.
There is also anecdotal and qualitative evidence that attorney advertising probably
increases bankruptcy filings.

Consumer bankruptcy lawyers report that they make

substantial use of advertising in attracting new clients.63 Indeed, several of the consumer
bankruptcy lawyers that Braucher interviewed in her 1993 study had hired marketing
firms to shape their advertising and marketing strategies.64 At a minimum, consumer
bankruptcy lawyers generally place display advertisements in the Yellow Pages but also
often advertise in major newspapers. Some even run television and radio advertisements.
Some lawyers use direct mailings to persons whose homes have been publicly listed for
foreclosure. Braucher concludes that the modest investments made in advertising had
more than recouped themselves in fees generated by clients. Yellow Page advertisements
are reported as the top source of clients in Braucher’s study.65
That information costs about bankruptcy are a significant barrier to filing
bankruptcy is evidenced in Braucher’s observation that one of the biggest difficulties for
a lawyer meeting with a new client is persuading the client that the bankruptcy system
truly is as generous as it seems to be, i.e., that there is no “catch.” The ease and
generosity of the current system defies individuals’ expectations about what could be
expected from bankruptcy. “People are pleasantly surprised” about what they can do in
bankruptcy, lawyers reported.66 One lawyer observed that chapter 7 “sometimes seems to

than a cause. Due to these necessary qualifications, it would be imprudent to draw firm conclusions from
the observed correlation between personal bankruptcy filings and attorney advertising.
63
Braucher, supra note 23, at 543.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 551.
66
Id. at 553.
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debtors to be ‘too good to be true; they can’t believe it.’”67 Some actually expressed
concern about the implications of the widespread knowledge of bankruptcy’s benefits;
one observed, “If Americans in general knew what you can do in bankruptcy, then we’d
really be in trouble.”68
A recent spate of high-profile celebrity bankruptcies has also increased public
awareness of the benefits of bankruptcy. The list includes celebrities such as Toni
Braxton, Kim Basinger, Burt Reynolds, M.C. Hammer,69 and, most recently boxer Mike
Tyson.70 Many lawyers, in fact, identify these famous bankrupts in order to persuade
clients of the social acceptability of filing bankruptcy.71 Although the direct impact of
this publicity is hard to measure empirically, it certainly contributes to public awareness
of bankruptcy and increases the social acceptance of bankruptcy generally.
Perhaps more important in increasing public awareness of the substantial benefits
of bankruptcy is “word of mouth” as a result of the sheer number of bankruptcies itself,
which surpassed 1.5 million households last year and continues to rise.72 The large
numbers of bankruptcy filing means that over time most everyone has come into contact
with the bankruptcy system either by filing themselves or by knowing a friend or family
member who has filed. This phenomenon is known as a “contagion” or “herding” effect

67

Id. at 553.
Id. at 554.
69
See Joshua Wolf Shenk, Bankrupt Policy, NEW REPUBLIC, May 18, 1998, at 16. In fact, Mr. Hammer
spoofed his bankruptcy filing in several recent television ads that aired during the 2005 Super Bowl.
70
See Tyson Filing for Bankruptcy, MIAMI HERALD 17 (Aug. 3, 2003).
71
Braucher, supra note 23, at 509 (“[Some debtors’] lawyers . . . in essence try to give their clients
‘permission’ to opt for quick discharge in chapter 7 . . . by naming famous people who have received a
bankruptcy discharge.”).
72
See Mamie Marcuss, A Look at Household Bankruptcies, COMMUNITIES & BANKING 15, 17 (Spring
2004).
68
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in economics, or less formally, as a “water cooler” effect.73

As more people file

bankruptcy, then there are more people in the populace to tell their friends and relatives
about the benefits of bankruptcy. As a result, this reduces the costs of those parties in
learning about bankruptcy, resulting in more bankruptcy filings. This second wave of
filers comes into contact with yet more potential filers and describe the process to them.
This self-reinforcing dynamic creates a hydraulic upward pressure on bankruptcy filing
rates. Surveys of bankruptcy filers reveals that friends and family are the single most
important source of information about bankruptcy and that a majority of bankruptcy filers
knew a friend or family member who had filed bankruptcy.74 Consistent with the model,
this number of people who first heard about filing bankruptcy from a personal
acquaintance also seems to rising over time.75
2.

Declining Transaction Costs

The transaction costs associated with filing bankruptcy have also declined in
recent years, in major part as an outgrowth of the increase in filings. A large and steady
flow of consumer bankruptcy filings has made possible the establishment of certain
economies of scale and specialization that decrease the marginal cost of processing
bankruptcy cases, such as capital investments in electronic technology and specialized

73

See also Fay, Hurst, & White, supra note 19, at n.13 (“information flows from early filers could cause
non-filers to revise their estimates of the costs of bankruptcy downward, so that they become more likely
to file”).
74
See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 212-13 (summarizing studies); Braucher, supra note 23, at 544
(reporting that many client referrals come from more people telling relatives, friends, and co-workers about
their bankruptcies); See McKinley, supra note 61, at 38 (noting results of Gallup poll, which found that 51
percent of bankruptcy filers had a close friend or relative who filed bankruptcy previously and Visa survey
of bankruptcy filers that found that 45 percent of filers learned about bankruptcy from friends or family).
75
See Bankruptcy Law Revision Before the Subcomm. On Commercial and Admin. Law of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. At *8 (1998) (testimony of Mallory B. Duncan, Vice-President,
General Counsel of National Retail Federation), available in1998 WL 8993460 (“[O]ne recent study
found a five hundred percent increase in less than two years in the number of filers who say they first
heard about the idea of filing from a friend or relative.”).
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paralegals that reduce the marginal cost of filing bankruptcy cases. As the costs of
processing bankruptcy cases fall, demand for bankruptcies will tend to rise.
In particular, so-called bankruptcy “mills” have evolved, that produce bankruptcy
cases as largely standardized commodities. Their practice is a high-volume, repetitive
one. Making heavy use of technology that allows them to generate “cookie cutter”
bankruptcy pleadings, these mills have been able to drive down the cost of filing
bankruptcy substantially. Using teams of paralegals and secretaries to supplement their
efforts, these attorneys represent hundreds of debtors per year.76 Most lawyers in highvolume practices meet only once with the client before filing a bankruptcy petition; few
meet more than twice.77 For those who do not want to or cannot pay for a lawyer, “do-ityourself” bankruptcy books have become a staple of bookstores and even grocery store
check-out lines. Huge amounts of information about bankruptcy is also available on the
Internet, including all of the forms needed to file bankruptcy.
The high volume of consumer bankruptcy filings has made it possible for certain
lawyers to establish practices focused on high-volume, repetitive cases.78

This

specialization has allowed these firms to realize economies of scale and to make capital
investments that have driven down the marginal cost of filing bankruptcy. 79 As these
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transaction costs of filing bankruptcy have fallen, this decreased price has created
incentives for higher bankruptcy filing rates. The large number of filings has also
indirectly increased the benefits of filing. A “substantial abuse” action under section
707(b), for instance, can be brought only by the United States Trustee or a Bankruptcy
Judge; thus the rising number of filings dramatically decreases the scrutiny that can be
applied to any particular case, increasing the possibility of abuse.
3.

Greater Availability of Post-Bankruptcy Credit

Traditionally a major cost of filing bankruptcy was the negative effect it had on
access to credit following bankruptcy.80 Indeed, traditionally it was perceived that filing
bankruptcy would cripple the ability to acquire new credit following bankruptcy. Today,
however, there have been changes in credit markets that have made credit more available
to former bankruptcy filers. One survey done a decade ago found that over 16 percent of
bankruptcy filers were able to gain unsecured credit within one year after filing
bankruptcy and over 55 percent within five years.81 A more recent survey finds that
three-quarters of bankruptcy filers have at least one credit card within a year after filing.82
Bankruptcy filers are able to gain access to a broad cross-section of revolving credit, such
as bank cards, department stores, gas cards, and finance companies, as well as installment
lenders.83 In fact, that figure would probably be higher today as a result of the growth in

Adam Feibelman, Defining the Social Insurance Function of Consumer Bankruptcy (working paper); see
also Buckley & Brinig, supra note 16, at 195; Gross & Souleles, supra note 57.
80
Today, filing bankruptcy remains on one’s credit rating for ten years. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(1).
81
See Michael Staten, The Impact of Post-Bankruptcy Credit on the Number of Personal Bankruptcies 1011, Credit Research Center, Krannert Graduate School of Management Working Paper, No. 58, Purdue
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credit at that time.
82
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Staten, Impact, supra note 81, at 11-12.
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the subprime lending market which has created an entire industry that caters to
consumers with damaged credit.
The traditional belief that bankruptcy filing would restrict access to credit
following bankruptcy no longer constrains a debtor’s behavior to the degree it once did.
To be sure, the debtor will likely suffer some penalty as a result of having a bankruptcy
filing on her credit rating. Nonetheless, developments in credit markets means that this
hardship is no longer as severe as it once may have been. As a result, this too has
reduced the effective costs associated with declaring bankruptcy.

III.

Changes in Social and Personal Norms Regarding Bankruptcy

Increasing bankruptcy filing rates can also be explained by changes in social and
personal norms regarding bankruptcy. There is a widespread perception that bankruptcy
has lost some of its previous social stigma, and that this has contributed to the increase in
bankruptcy filing rates.84 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, for instance, has
stated bluntly, “Personal bankruptcies are soaring because Americans have lost their
sense of shame.”85 The impact of a decline in personal shame and social stigma on
bankruptcy filing rates is straightforward. A reduction in the generalized social stigma
associated with filing bankruptcy will reduce the negative impact that a particular
individual will suffer to his personal reputation from filing bankruptcy, making
individuals more willing to file. As bankruptcy becomes a less socially stigmatized
84

For instance, in his floor statement on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, Senator Charles Grassley
referred to a public opinion poll that indicated that fully 85% of Americans believe that bankruptcy has
less social stigma than in previous eras. Professor Braucher also quotes numerous lawyers who opine that
the increase in bankruptcy filing rates has been driven in part by a decline in the traditional social stigma
associated with filing bankruptcy. See Braucher, supra note 23, at 540; id. at 545. See also Charles A.
Luckett, Personal Bankruptcies, in IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 44, at 69, 73 (“It is widely
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activity, the reputational harm from filing bankruptcy falls as well, creating a vicious
cycle of eroding norms and rising bankruptcy filings. In fact, it is not even necessary that
there is a decline in the actual stigma attached to filing bankruptcy, so long as potential
bankruptcy filers perceive that there has been a reduction in the stigma attached to filing
bankruptcy.
A.

Consequences of Change in Social Norms Regarding Bankruptcy
The negative social and economic effect of changes in social norms regarding

bankruptcy is amplified because it disproportionately affects a discrete category of
individuals who have the most to gain financially by filing. Under current bankruptcy
law, the economic benefits of filing bankruptcy tend to rise as the filer’s income and
wealth rises because exemptions are linked to specified types of property deemed
essential to the debtor’s fresh start, such as houses, cars, and other such property.86
Because the financial benefit of bankruptcy is largest for high-income and high-wealth
debtors, the importance of social norms in restraining bankruptcy filing is highest also for
this same group. If those constraints weaken, therefore, the impact at the margin in terms
of higher filings will be largest for high-income and high-wealth individuals.
Although the theory is straightforward, empirically measuring changes in broad
and diffuse social factors such as shame and stigma is difficult and do not easily lend
themselves to direct testing.87 For instance, it is not methodologically correct to simply
ask bankruptcy filers whether they felt “ashamed” or perceived social disapproval from
86

See supra note 30-31 and accompanying text.
See Luckett, Personal Bankruptcies, supra note 84, at 76 (noting that “none of the typically cited social
or legal factors are easily quantifiable”); Gross and Souleles, supra note 57, at 321 (“The various costs of
default, especially social, legal, and information costs, are inherently difficult to measure. Most of the
proxies that have been suggested run into problems of endogeneity and reverse causality.”); See David A.
Moss & Gibbs A. Johnson, The Rise of Consumer Bankruptcy: Evolution, Revolution, or Both?, 73 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 311, 326 (1999) (“stigma is very difficult to measure”).
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filing bankruptcy.88 For purposes of the stigma-bankruptcy connection it is completely
beside the point whether people feel bad about bankruptcy after they actually file; what
matters is whether the stigma is sufficiently strong to deter them from filing at all, or
perhaps even more importantly, to encourage them to live a sufficiently prudent life such
that financial crises is less likely. The argument is that the constraining effect of shame
and stigma has gradually declined at the margin, reducing the psychological cost of filing
bankruptcy making some people more willing to file than they otherwise would be, not
that the shame and stigma associated with bankruptcy have been completely eliminated
or that those who actually file bankruptcy do not feel ashamed anymore.
A direct test of the effect of personal shame and social stigma on bankruptcy
filings, therefore, is essentially impossible—it would require identifying those marginal
individuals who would have filed bankruptcy but for the negative effect on his
conscience or reputation from doing so. Because these individuals never show up in
bankruptcy court, it is almost impossible to identify this group of people for research
purposes. Even more difficult to identify would be that category of individuals who
respond to the reduced shame associated with bankruptcy by living more closely to the
financial edge than they otherwise would. Nonetheless, if social norms have changed,
there is little doubt that would lead to increased filings.
Social norms are a low-cost mechanism for promoting social order and
discouraging anti-social behavior. Norms substitute for more formal economic, political,
and social institutions, such as police and courts. For instance, a society that develops
88

Nonetheless, some scholars have done exactly that. See, e.g., Constance M. Kilmark, Inside the World of
the Troubled Debtor, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRACTICE 257 (2001); see also ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA
WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING
BROKE 73-75 (2003); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN, & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 32 (2000).
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and maintains a social norm against property theft (in addition to having a police force
that prevents theft) will achieve more order at less expense than a society that can prevent
theft only through the maintenance of a large police force with no norm against theft.89
Moreover, in order to attain the same degree of social harmony, it will be necessary to
support a larger police force in the latter society as compared to the former. A reduction
in the constraining force of a prosocial norm, therefore, will impose costs on society, both
in the form of reduced social harmony and lower levels of economic exchange, as well as
a the expense of constructing and operating more formal institutions, such as police.
It is difficult to quantify the full costs to the American economy and society of the
decline in social norms against bankruptcy. The experience of Memphis, Tennessee,
however, is suggestive.90 In 1996, 4.3% of Memphis families filed bankruptcy, almost 1
in 23, earning Memphis the sobriquet of the “bankruptcy capital of America.” According
to a Fortune magazine article, there is a “culture of bankruptcy” in Memphis, and
bankruptcy is “a way of life.” As the magazine notes, “Because so many people have
lived through bankruptcy, there’s a strong informal support network for anyone in
financial trouble. Friends and neighbors tell each other ‘bankruptcy works,’ says David
Monypenny, Jerry Lee Lewis’s [who also filed for bankruptcy] manager.” Other indicia
of an active bankruptcy culture are prominent. The article continues, “There’s also
plenty of professional support for bankruptcy: The Memphis Yellow Pages features more
than a dozen large lawyers’ ads offering to wipe out debts for no down payment; a Honda
89

An analogy is the well-established finding that voluntary norms of tax compliance substantially reduce
the amount of resources that the Internal Revenue Service has to expend on audits, enforcement, litigation,
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dealer (its slogan: ‘The bankruptcy specialists’) runs TV commercials promising to sell
you a car no matter what your credit history.”

But the costs are also significant.

Consider Fortune’s description of everyday financial life in Memphis: “It’s almost
impossible to cash checks in Memphis. Used-car dealers charge their wholesale cost as a
down payment. And lenders are either tightening or giving up. First Enterprise Financial
Group, for instance, an Illinois-based sub-prime lender, closed its Memphis operations in
May.”91
As this example suggests, a decline in norms discouraging bankruptcy thus has
two effects: a deadweight loss from the reduction of mutually-beneficial trades as well as
a reduction in economic efficiency as a result of increasing use of “self-help” ex ante
measures by lenders to offset the lower reliability of financial contracts. Given the
variety of possible responses, it may be difficult to estimate the full social loss that results
form these various offsetting costs. More formal institutional responses, such as large
downpayments and higher interest rates can provide some response to fill the vacuum
created by the breakdown of informal bonds of trust. But these deadweight losses and ex
ante adjustment costs fall on innocent and opportunistic borrowers alike.
B.

Empirical Evidence of Effects of Changes in Norms on Filings
Because of the inability to measure changes in social norms directly, indirect

proxies have been used to try test for the effect of changes in social stigma regarding
bankruptcy, primarily by trying to isolate the features of “bankruptcy cultures” that
exhibit persistently high filing rates after controlling for other economically relevant
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variables.92 Using district-level date, Fay, Hurst, and White find that after controlling for
other relevant variables, there are systematic patterns of higher filing rates in particular
districts, either because the higher level of filings increases information about bankruptcy
or because the prevalence of bankruptcy in the community reduces the stigma attached to
filing.93 Gross and Souleles use similar statistical measures, and similarly find that after
controlling for economic risk, the probability that a given individual will file for
bankruptcy is in part a function of the number of people who filed for bankruptcy in the
recent past in that community.94 This correlation in filing rates that cannot be explained
by economic risk variables suggests the presence of a stigma or information effect in
local communities that explain bankruptcy filing rates.95
Empiricists also have tried to test for the effect of stigma on bankruptcy filings by
examining proxy variables that can serve as quantifiable proxies for the strength of social
norms generally, such as by examining the size and stability of the relevant community to
determine if bankruptcy filing rates differ according to community size. If a fear of
social disapproval deters bankruptcy filing, then bankruptcy filings should be higher in
larger, more anonymous communities than in smaller communities. Residents of larger
communities are likely to possess less knowledge of their neighbors’ reputations and also

92

For a review and critique of several of the studies discussed here, see Gordon Bermant, What’s Stigma
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less-likely to fear their disapproval. In fact, cities with higher population densities have
higher bankruptcy filing rates than smaller communities.96 This finding is consistent with
more general studies that find that individuals who live in small towns tend to be both
more trusting and more trustworthy than those from big cities.97 These factors indicate
that norms of trust and trustworthiness are higher in small communities, suggesting that
the conditions for trust and reciprocity to flourish (repeat-dealing and reputational
mechanisms) are present in these communities.
Societies with higher patterns of migration also tend to have higher bankruptcy
filing rates, presumably because more transient populations will tend to have more
attenuated social ties, less concern about social reputation, and weaker norms.98 Repeat
dealings will be of shorter duration and subject to a higher discount rate than in morestable societies.

Where conditions make detection and monitoring of neighbors’

reputations difficult, social norms will be less powerful in discouraging disapproved
behavior. Thus, in high migration areas where individuals frequently move in and out of
the community in a short time frame, it is difficult to punish those who behave
improperly, thereby reducing the incentives of others to collect and act on reputational
information.
A final way that scholars have measured the influence of norms on bankruptcy
rates is by the residual effect that remains after controlling for all other variables that
might otherwise be thought to explain bankruptcy filings.

Empirical studies of
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bankruptcy filing rates consistently find large unexplained statistical residuals after
controlling for all other economic variables. These statistical residuals could result from
a number of possible causes, but many have attributed them to a change in social norms.
As economist Charles Luckett observes, “Of course, to the extent that a model is
comprehensive in its incorporation of likely determinants of bankruptcy, declining stigma
may be left as the most plausible candidate to account for the otherwise unexplained
component of rising bankruptcies.”99
C.

Causes of Changes in Social Norms Regarding Bankruptcy
The reasons for the erosion of the traditional stigma of filing bankruptcy are

multiple and are hard to pin down with precision, and providing a theory of the evolution
of social norms over time is beyond the scope of this article. Social theorists have long
struggled with developing a theory of how social norms are created and evolve over time,
so any observations here are necessarily speculative. If there has been a change in social
norms, the explanation may rest in deep-seated changes in American culture in that have
tended to erode the value of promise-keeping and performing one’s obligations generally,
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which might be reflected in changing attitudes regarding bankruptcy.100 McCloskey, for
instance, argues that there has been a general attrition of broadly-accepted middle-class
values of “bourgeois virtue” that praised thrift and personal responsibility, and
condemned bankruptcy, divorce, and other behaviors.101
With respect to bankruptcy specifically, complaints about the supposed “decline
in stigma” regarding bankruptcy have recurred many times in American history.102 The
question, therefore, is whether there really has been tangible a change in social norms
regarding bankruptcy during the past 25 years, and if so, why has such a dramatic change
occurred in such a short period of time? Given the difficulty in understanding such broad
social currents as changes in social norms, the discussion presented here is necessarily
tentative. Nonetheless, given the importance of the issue and a widespread perception
that it is indeed an important element of the explanation of rising bankruptcies, the issue
merits some discussion.
One possible explanation turns on the generational change associated with the rise
of the “Baby Boom” generation to a position of leadership in American society.103
Changes in broad social norms tend to occur only gradually,104 but sociologist Robert
Putnam has argued that the transition from the World War II generation to the Baby
Boom generation marked a dramatic change in American life, and in particular, with
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respect to changing attitudes of social engagement and personal responsibility.105
Although an overgeneralization, the Baby Boom generation has been notable in its
willingness to challenge established traditional American values, good and bad.106 Thus,
there has general overturning of traditional taboos regarding issues as varied as marriage,
sexuality, recreational drug use, and role of women in the economy and society.107
Moreover, given the very size and self-confidence of the baby boom generation, they
have arguably been able to influence social norms to a greater degree than most
generations. The Baby Boom generation has served as a sort of collective “norms
entrepreneur” for widespread changes in a variety of traditional social norms.108 It may
be that these broad social changes also tended to undermine social norms regarding
personal financial responsibility and the social stigma associated with bankruptcy.109
Earlier generations seem to have held a much more negative view of the personal shame
and social stigma associated with bankruptcy than do the Baby Boomers.110 Although
these observations fall far short of a rigorous proof of the possible relationship between
the rise of the Baby Boom generation and the decline in stigma beginning in the 1970s
105

See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE 249-50 (2000).
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and 1980s, they are consistent with other characteristics of the Baby Boom generation, as
well as providing at least one possible explanation as to the specific timing of this change
in social norms.111
The specific bankruptcy filing patterns of baby boomers is consistent with these
more general observations.

Baby Boomers are dramatically over-represented in

bankruptcy filings relative to their percentage in the population.112 Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook observe, “The overrepresentation of the baby boom [in bankruptcy] is
striking.”113 In addition, the overrepresentation of baby boomers in bankruptcy has
following them through their economic life-cycle, indicating that the tendency toward
bankruptcy is a reflection of factors unique to their generation, not a function of more
generic passage through age and financial life cycle.114 When they were the 25-34 yearold cohort of the population, they were both the largest single group in bankruptcy, as
well as having the highest filing rate. Ten years later, when they were aged 35-44, they
were again the largest group in bankruptcy as well has having the highest filing rate.115
Moreover, because the baby boomers are such a large cohort, the spike in bankruptcy
filings among their generation counts for about 14 percent of the growth in the filing
rates, certainly enough of a critical mass to move social norms.116 Baby Boomers have
matured during a period of economic growth and record wealth accumulation, thus it is
111
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doubtful that this reflects unusual levels of economic stress, especially compared earlier
generations such as the Great Depression. This persistent record of unusually high
bankruptcy filings is consistent with the impression that the Baby Boom generation has
effected a dramatic change in social norms, for both good and bad, including traditional
norms condemning bankruptcy.
The unique baby boomer effect on changing social norms about bankruptcy is
reflected in the difference in their filing rates as compared to subsequent generations as
well. Whereas baby boomers have filed bankruptcy at much higher rates than the rest of
the population at large at every stage of their life-cycle, the early evidence is that the per
capita filing rate among members of so-called “Generation X” has actually fallen from
that of the baby boomers at the same stage of their life cycle.117

According to

researchers, members of Generation X appear to be more financially and socially
responsible and traditionalist than the Baby Boom generation, which may reverse or slow
some of the baby boomer’s effects on changing social norms regarding bankruptcy.118
On the other hand, although Generation X’s bankruptcy filing rate is lower than the
boomers, is still remains high by historical standards, suggesting and that the baby
boomers have left a permanent mark on the nation’s social norms regarding bankruptcy,
and that generation change will not reverse underlying change in norms.119
The intervention of bankruptcy attorneys may also play a role in eroding personal
shame regarding bankruptcy. In general, debtors’ attorneys seem to be somewhat more
117
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hostile toward creditors than are their clients and are especially dismissive of the belief
that there is a moral, as opposed to purely legal, obligation to repay creditors. Thus,
Professor Braucher’s interview subjects express frustration regarding their clients’ belief
that they have a moral obligation to repay the debts that they have incurred. Much of the
counseling that goes on between debtors’ attorneys and their clients seems to revolve
around this desire to counsel the client out f his moral desire to repay his debts. One
lawyer observed, “[S]ome people feel there is a moral issue; frankly I don’t.”120 Another
lawyer stated, “My attitude is – the law is there. The credit card companies charge 20%
interest. Discharge is a risk of doing business. I don’t feel bad about it. Some debtors
feel so harassed. Some debtors say they feel bad about discharging debt, and I wonder if
they do. Some are overly emotional, and I’m thinking, ‘What’s the big deal?’ Especially
with credit cards – it’s not like a friend or a relative.”121
Many attorneys attack the moral and trust basis of the debtor-creditor relationship
by contrasting this obligation with others that are generally regarded as having greater
moral weight. “A number of lawyers in the study,” Braucher reports, “said that they find
themselves trying to talk debtors out of [the desire to repay their debts in] chapter 13.
They use such tactics as raising the question of their clients’ moral obligations to their
families, especially to their children, in order to diffuse clients’ sense of moral obligation
to repay creditors.”122 When the moral obligation to pay creditors, especially distant
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Braucher, Lawyers, supra note 23, at 523.
Id. at 563.
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institutional creditors, is pitted against the moral obligations owed to one’s family, it is
evident that the latter obligation will almost always prevail.123
A change in social norms regarding bankruptcy also may be to some extent a
consequence of the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. A diminishment of the
stigma associated with filing bankruptcy was implicit in the 1978 Code. The Code
expanded the nondiscrimination provision of section 525 to prohibit many forms of
private discrimination against bankruptcy debtors and virtually all forms of public
discrimination against debtors.124

The Code also purged the normatively-laden but

ancient term “bankrupt” from the Code, substituting the more value-neutral term
“debtor”125; similarly, a case filing is described generically as an “order for relief.”126
The effect, if not the intent, of these semantic changes may have been in part to strip
bankruptcy of moral and emotional baggage that had previously interfered with a straight
financial calculation. To the extent that legal rules have an “expressive” function in
shaping social norms through law, it is possible that these semantic changes and the
behaviors they regulate could also have an effect on reducing general attitudes of
opprobrium toward bankruptcy filers.127
The sheer number of filers alone has also probably tended to reduce the stigma
associated with filing bankruptcy. As more individuals file bankruptcy, more people
know others who have filed bankruptcy.

The recognition that others have filed

bankruptcy and have survived – indeed, in many cases prospered – makes bankruptcy
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See Zywicki, Screwtape, supra note 19; see also Todd J. Zywicki, Evolutionary Psychology and Social
Science, 13 HUMANE STUDIES REV. 1 (2000), available in http://www.theihs.org/libertyguide/hsr/.
124
11 U.S.C. §525.
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See Jones and Zywicki, supra note 3, at 219.
126
Id.
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See Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998).
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more routine in society, reducing the stigma associated with it. Thus, the sheer numbers
of individuals who file bankruptcy contribute to the perception that bankruptcy is a
common and routine process.128 As the late Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan observed
in a famous article, society can only define so much of a given behavior as “deviant.”129
Once a behavior becomes sufficiently widespread, at some point society redefines the
behavior so as to relieve it of its “deviant” label, thereby implicitly tolerating previously
inappropriate behavior.130

Thus, as bankruptcy becomes more common, especially

among the middle class, it may lose some of its previous “deviant” social character and
become more socially acceptable.
The problem of enforcing traditional social norms may also be more difficult by
the existence of celebrities and others who publicly flout those norms. As noted, there
have been several high-profile celebrity bankruptcies in recent years, which have
arguably contributed to the sense that the bankruptcy stigma is eroding. These celebrities
may be unintentional “norms entrepreneurs” who subtly shift patterns of behavior in
society.

Similar views are expressed by more pedestrian bankruptcy filers, a large

128

Thus, the argument regarding declining stigma and rising bankruptcy rates is not circular, as argued by
some, see SULLIVAN ET AL., FRAGILE, supra note 88, at 265, because this feedback loop takes place
gradually and over time. Social norms do not change immediately and all at once, and bankruptcy rates do
not immediately jump to a higher equilibrium level. Instead, there is a gradual unraveling over time, as
higher filings and declining stigma create a feedback loop. See COLEMAN, supra note 104.
129
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 AMERICAN SCHOLAR 17, 19 (1993).
130
One bankruptcy filer confessed in a CNN interview, “When I found out—this was watching it on the
news, on the newspapers—that more and more people are doing it [filing bankruptcy], and . . . it’s not just a
middle class you know, upper class too—rich people—everybody’s doing it. And . . . I said: Why not me?
You know, I’m just one more of theme.” Your Money with John Metaxas (CNNfn television broadcast,
Jan. 18, 1999). In fact, whereas bankruptcy itself was once thought a deviant activity, today it is only
bankruptcy fraud and abuse by rich filers that is thought of as deviant, and some bankruptcy scholars
appear to have doubts about even this. See, e.g., KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS (2000).
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number of which report that filing bankruptcy was fast, easy, and painless and that they
would consider filing again if necessary.131
This is not to say that changes in social norms regarding bankruptcy are automatic
or immediate. Filing bankruptcy and breaching the obligations of reciprocity strongly
contradicts our inherent tendencies toward reciprocity and promise-keeping.132 To the
extent that negative social norms and other incentives break down these innate
cooperative tendencies, they generally do so only after long-lasting and intense
pressure.133 It would be inaccurate today to say that society actively encourages filing
bankruptcy. But it seems accurate to characterize attitudes as drifting toward benign
tolerance, thereby leading to increasing bankruptcies.

To the extent that this drift

continues, it could create a vicious cycle, further undermining social norms and leading
to still higher bankruptcy filings.

IV.

Changes in The Nature of Consumer Credit

A final contributing factor to the rise in bankruptcy filing rates in recent years is a
change in the nature of consumer credit and in consumer credit relations. Consumer
credit institutions have changed in a number of ways that at the margin would be
expected to destabilize traditional debtor-creditor relationships and thereby increase
bankruptcy filing rates. Many of these changes have been inevitable—they are the
unintended side-effect of technological and economic changes that have created more a
economically efficient consumer credit system. From an economic perspective they are
131

See McKinley, supra note 61, at 38 (describing findings of a Visa survey that “66% of filers found the
bankruptcy process to be an easy one” and that 27% of respondents would consider filing again).
132
See Todd J. Zywicki, The Reciprocity Instinct (working paper).
133
See Kevin McCabe, “Fiat Money as a Store of Value in an Experimental Market,” 12 J. ECON.
BEHAVIOR AND ORG. 215 (1989).
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beneficial and should be encouraged, even though a side-effect is that these same forces
tend to undermine many of the traditional mechanisms for restraining opportunistic
breach of credit contracts and have tended to exert upward pressure on bankruptcy filing
rates. So long as the overall benefits of more efficient credit markets exceed the costs of
increased bankruptcies, this is a positive development. The policy question is how to
devise the set of institutions that maximizes the benefits of these financial innovations
while minimizing the costs associated with them in terms of higher bankruptcies.
A.

The Shift to Credit Cards and Unsecured Consumer Credit
A general shift toward greater use of unsecured credit, such as credit cards, has

increased the frequency of bankruptcy. Recent decades have seen a shift in consumer
credit toward unsecured credit, primarily in the form of general purpose bank credit
cards. Unsecured credit, such as credit cards and medical bills, is generally dischargeable
in bankruptcy absent some particular limitation imposed by bankruptcy law making
certain unsecured debts nondischargeable.134 By contrast, the bankruptcy discharge is of
little use to the debtor with respect to secured credit, such as home mortgages, home
equity loans, security interests in personal property, layaway plans, or pawn shops.
Bankruptcy discharge will also not help a debtor with informal credit arrangements such
as loans from family members, historically the dominant source of most consumer
credit.135 Holding everything else constant, therefore, as debtors make greater use of
unsecured credit relative secured and informal credit, the value of the bankruptcy
discharge will also increase. As the value of the bankruptcy discharge increases, debtors
will have a greater incentive to file bankruptcy.

134
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See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a).
See CALDER, supra note 102.
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Although credit cared use has risen dramatically during this period, contrary to
conventional wisdom, there is little evidence that credit cards have increased overall
consumer indebtedness, because the increase primarily has been a substitution of credit
card debt for other types of consumer debt. Although this may seem irrational at first
glance given the seemingly “high” interest rates charged on credit cards, consider that for
consumers the alternatives may include pawn shops, personal finance companies, retail
store credit, and layaway plans, all of which are either more costly or otherwise less
attractive than credit cards.136 Credit cards are also generally less expensive for lenders
to issue, which is reflected in the overall price of credit cards relative to these other forms
of credit. The result, therefore, has not been to increase household indebtedness, but
primarily to change the composition of debt within the household credit portfolio.137 The
substitution has increased the use of “revolving” credit card debt, which a borrower can
revolve from month to month, and decreased “installment” debt, such as car loans, credit
from retailers (such as furniture stores), and loans from personal finance loans, where the
debtor borrows a fixed amount of money and repays it in fixed installments over a fixed
period of time.
Figure 3 demonstrates that the increase in credit card debt is a substitute for a
reduction in other traditional forms of consumer installment debt:

136

See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAPMAN L. REV. 79, 94-110 (2000).
Presumably there has been a substitution for informal credit as well, such as family loans and pawn shops,
but there is little data on the amount of informal borrowing in the economy.
137
The reduction in transaction costs and availability of credit on more competitive terms would, of
course, have an implicit wealth effect, shifting out consumer budget constraints and enabling marginally
more borrowing. But because they would also be wealthier, consumers could borrow more without
increasing their effective debt burden, thus this increase in indebtedness would not be expected to have
any greater correlation with bankruptcy. In fact, the debt-service and debt-to-asset ratios have remained
largely constant during recent years, further confirms the idea that the increase in new forms of credit are
largely a substitute away from old forms of debt. See Zywicki, Economic Analysis, supra note 1.
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Figure 3: Consumer Credit Oustanding as Percentage of
Disposable Personal Income, 1959-2003
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As Figure 3 indicates, the growth in revolving (credit card) debt over the past
twenty-five years has clearly been a substitution from nonrevolving consumer debt to
revolving debt, thus leaving overall consumer indebtedness (as a percentage of disposable
income) largely unaffected.138 Revolving debt outstanding has risen during this period
from zero to roughly 9% of outstanding debt.139 Nonrevolving installment debt, by

138

See also Thomas A. Durkin, Credit Cards: Use and Consumer Attitudes, 1970-2000, FED. RES. BULL.
623, 623-24 (Sept. 2000) (noting that total consumer credit outstanding has risen in tandem with income
growth); Thomas A. Durkin, in IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 44, at 35, 38, 39 Figure 2 (noting
that ratio of consumer credit to income has remained relatively stable since 1956).
139
In fact, this figure probably overstates the amount of revolving debt held by American households. The
majority of credit card users are convenience users who use credit cards as a transactional device and pay
their balances in full each month, rather than revolving. The percentage of convenience users relative to
revolvers has risen steadily over time as credit cards have replaced cash as a transaction mechanism. See
Zywicki, Economics of Credit Cards, supra note 136, at 101; Ana M. Aizcorbe, Arthur B. Kennickell, &
Kevin B. Moore, Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of
Consumer Finances 25 FEDERAL RES. BULL. 1, 3 (Jan. 2003) (reporting that 55.3% of households pay their
credit card bills in full each month). Nonetheless, during that thirty-day cycle period convenience users are
measured statistically as having outstanding credit balances that are added into the calculation of revolving
debt. As William Hampel observes, “[S]ome people have large balances every month, but also pay their
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contrast, has fallen from its level of 19% of disposable income in the 1960s, to roughly
12% today. Thus, the increase in revolving debt has been almost exactly offset by a
decrease in the installment debt burden. In fact the recent bump in total indebtedness in
recent years was not caused by an increase in revolving debt, which has remained largely
constant for several years, but by an increase in installment debt, primarily as a result of a
recent increase in car loans for the purchase of new automobiles.140 There is little
indication that increased use of credit cards has precipitated greater financial stress
among American households, because the increase in credit card usage has resulted
primarily from a substitution of credit cards for other types of consumer credit, rather
than an overall increase in indebtedness.141
Unlike traditional forms of consumer credit, however, credit card and other
unsecured debt is generally unsecured and dischargeable in bankruptcy. Thus, holding
total debt constant, substituting dischargeable unsecured debt for nondischargeable forms
of debt will increase the propensity of a given individual to file bankruptcy. This may
explain the observed tendency of credit card defaults and defaults on other forms of
unsecured consumer debt to track bankruptcy filing rates, whereas there seems to be no
similar correlation between bankruptcy filings and defaults on home mortgage loans or

balances in full every month. This exaggerates the size of revolving credit as a proportion of total credit
and underestimates the amount of payments that takes place each month.” See William Hempel,
Discussion, in IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 44, at 66, 67. See also id. (“Very simply, revolving
credit . . . is not all debt. I do not know of any data source that tells us how much of current revolving
credit is merely transaction balances.”).
140
See Aizcorbe, et al., supra note 139, at 24. In particular, the growing popularity of sport utility vehicles,
which are both more expensive and more valuable than traditional cars, thus they simultaneously increased
indebtedness and increased household assets through their purchase. Id. at 17.
141
See Hempel, supra note 139, at 67 (“consumer credit has been fairly constant relative to income over the
past 30 years, but the composition has changed”).
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secured auto loans.142 For unsecured debts, the debtor can discharge the debts in question
at little cost, whereas in the latter case the debtor will suffer the high cost of losing his
house.

If bankruptcies were best explained as an involuntary response to adverse

economic shocks, it would be expected that defaults on mortgage, automobile, and credit
card debt, should be rising more or less in unison, because there would be no obvious
reason why an individual would be “unable” to pay some debts but not others. Given the
different default rates on these various forms of credit, it is evident consumers are
consciously choosing to pay some debts but not others—defaulting on their unsecured
obligations, but paying their secured debts. Thus, the general substitution by consumers
in recent years toward unsecured debt, primarily as the result of greater use of credit
cards, would tend to increase bankruptcy filing rates by increasing the percentage of debt
that is dischargeable in bankruptcy.
In addition, there is some evidence that bankruptcy filers tend to increase their
credit card balances in the period leading up to bankruptcy.143 Credit card debt rises
rapidly and is concentrated in the months immediately preceding bankruptcy suggests
that credit card indebtedness does not cause bankruptcy in many cases, but that the debtor
is already on the way toward bankruptcy when the credit card borrowing begins, and is
either acting strategically as part of a credit card “bust out” or is simply drawing on credit
cards as a line of credit of last resort. Regardless, the effect is to dramatically increase
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See Lawrence M. Ausubel, Credit Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 249 (1997) (finding correlation between credit card defaults and bankruptcy filings); Thomas A.
Durkin, in DURKIN AND STATEN, supra note 44, at 36, 38, and Figure 3 (finding no correlation with defaults
on automobile loans and home mortgages).
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credit card use during a time when the debtor either knows he is going to file bankruptcy
eventually or is likely to do so.144
It also has been argued that credit cards have contributed to increased
bankruptcies through a profligate expansion of credit card credit to high-risk borrowers,
especially low-income borrowers.145 Although often-repeated, empirical studies have
failed to support this theory. As with consumers in general, the growth in credit card debt
among low-income households has been primarily a substitution of credit cards for other
for other types of credit, such as pawn shops and payday lenders, not an overall increase
in indebtedness. In fact, empirical researchers have failed to find evidence that rising
consumer bankruptcies have been caused by extension of credit cards to less creditworthy borrowers, because the growth in credit card debt represents a substitution from
other forms of credit, not an expansion of overall consumer indebtedness.146
Thus, there is an observed correlation between credit card defaults and
bankruptcy, but the available evidence fails to provide an economic risk-based
explanation for the correlation. This anomaly suggests that those who believe that the
expansion of credit card use has contributed to rising bankruptcy filings may be correct—
but for the wrong reason. Credit cards have not increased indebtedness and household
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These credit card debts may be presumed nondischargeable under §523(a)(2)(C) as fraudulently
induced, but only if they aggregate to over $1,150 within 60 days of bankruptcy for “luxury goods and
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See Elizabeth Warren, The Bankruptcy Crisis, 73 IND. L.J. 1079, 1081 (1998); Susan L. DeJarnatt, Once
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financial distress, but instead have simply substituted impersonal unsecured credit for
more localized secured credit. On the other hand, because credit card debt is unsecured
and dischargeable in bankruptcy, this substitution has increased the benefits of filing
bankruptcy, notwithstanding the fact that credit cards have not increased overall
consumer indebtedness.
B.

Greater Nationalization and Impersonalization of Consumer Credit
This trend in consumer credit has also led to increased bankruptcy filings in a

second way, by making consumer credit relations less “personal” in nature. Although
“greater impersonalization” of consumer credit is difficult to measure, there is a
widespread perception that credit relations, especially for consumer credit, have become
increasingly impersonalized in recent years as compared to the past.147 This change in
credit relations has affected the willingness of individuals to file bankruptcy in three
different ways: (1) by undermining the development of commercial trust relationships;
(2) by undermining the constraints imposed by repeat dealings; and, (3) by reducing the
constraints of individual credit reputation.
Consumer credit was historically a highly personalized transaction, e.g., a corner
grocery store or Main Street tailor selling goods to their customers on credit.148 Bank
credit, for instance, required the debtor to withstand a personal and intrusive series of
face-to-face interviews and probing inquiry into his social and business relationships to
determine the debtor’s trustworthiness and reliability. In fact, historically a major source
of consumer credit was informal loans between family members.149 Traditional credit
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Rafael Efrat, The Moral Appeal of Personal Bankruptcy, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 141, 161 (1998); see
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was of a highly personal and face-to-face nature, and the credit relationship is embedded
within an ongoing economic and social relationship with the credit issuer. Where the
credit relationship is embedded in the context of a social and economic relationship, it is
more likely that a trust relationship will arise between the parties.150
Today, many consumer financial relations are conducted with large interstate
banks and South Dakota and Delaware-based credit card issuers such as Citibank and
MBNA. Impersonal credit relations, such as dealing with these institutional lenders, are
less likely to evolve into high-trust relations, and these weaker extralegal constraints
make individuals more willing to breach those promises.151 In part, this is because
individuals do not tend to form trust relationships with artificial entities, such as
corporations, in the same way that they do with other human beings. These economic
exchange relations lack the embedded personal and extended economic relations that
characterize older and more local forms of credit. Thus, an individual is less likely to feel
himself bound in a trust relationship with his credit card issuer than he would be if he
purchased a suit on store credit from his local tailor.152 Indeed, as David Skeel observes,
part of the impetus for the 1898 Bankruptcy Act was the concern of merchants who
engaged in interstate commerce that when debtors ran into financial trouble they “played
favorites” with their creditors, preferring “family members and local creditors, not the
150

Efrat, supra note 147, at 159.
Efrat, supra note 147, at 159.
152
As Efrat observes: “[A] consumer debtor is less likely to develop a trust relationship beyond the
deterrence-based level with a large credit card company. The consumer debtor is not likely to have any
face-to-face contact with the institutional creditor. The parties infrequently communicate, and when they
do, they mainly use impersonal channels such as a telephone. Furthermore, a courtship will not likely
develop between the parties. The parties are not likely to watch each other act in social situations or
observe each other in [a] variety of emotional states. Therefore, the lack of personal bonding precludes
most of these types of relationships from developing into a knowledge-based credit trust relationship.”
Efrat, supra note 147, at 159. This same analysis could apply to the development of trust relationships by
creditors, but the primary constraint on lender opportunism are contracts and other more formal
institutions, including legislation and regulation, as well as repeat-dealing and reputation effects, thus trust
seems much less relevant on the lender’s side of the transaction.
151
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out-of-state merchants.”153

Lower-trust relationships, therefore, are more prone to

opportunism than in high-trust transaction contexts.
Individuals psychologically evaluate transactions differently depending on
whether they are of a personalized or an impersonalized nature. The closer is the social
connection between the trading partners, the greater is the likelihood that the individuals
will trust one another.154 The longer the parties have known each other, and the more
integrated their social network and the number of mutual friends they have in common,
the more likely they are to trust one another.155 Individuals also appear to be more likely
to recognize the positive-sum nature of personal relations marked by an ongoing
reciprocity of mutual advantage and to vest these “win-win” relationships with positive
moral weight.156 By contrast, individuals tend see impersonal relationships as zero-sum
in nature, removing a psychological constraint on acting opportunistically.157
The growth of credit cards illustrates the trend toward more national and
impersonal credit. Prior to the widespread development and use of credit cards, the
American consumer economy was highly localized. Even if one was merely traveling, it
could be very difficult to get credit if necessary. In the past, individuals had to make use
of more indirect and costly means for proving their creditworthiness to strangers. For
instance, when Max Weber visited the United States in 1904, he witnessed an adult
baptism by immersion.158 When he inquired as to why the individual sought baptism he
was informed that it was so that he could open a bank. Because Baptist congregations
153
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conducted in-depth character evaluations of individuals before admitting them as
members, “Admission to the congregation [was] recognized as an absolute guarantee of
the moral qualities of a gentleman, especially of those qualities required in business
matters.”159 Thus, “When a sect member moved to a different place, or if he was a
traveling salesman, he carried the certificate of his congregation with him; and thereby
found not only easy contact with sect members but, above all, he found credit
everywhere.”
These informal means of establishing credit have been supplanted by credit cards
a universal medium of credit. “The sects’ inquiries into the would-be member’s probity
are paralleled by the credit card company’s scrutiny of the would-be cardholders’ credit
record.”160 Today, “In a large and anonymous society such as the United States, many
people carry credit cards, which speak for them to people with whom they have had no
previous contact and with whom they may well never be in contact again.”161
This trend towards more impersonalized credit has increased the efficiency of
American consumer credit markets and expanded consumer choice in credit. Prior to the
nationalization of credit markets, rural consumers suffered from the lack of competition
among banks as issuers of credit.162 Small-town debtors had limited ability to shop
around to get competing offers of credit. Thus, while a debtor might personally know the
loan officer at the bank, in many instances this personalized relationship came at the cost

159
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of reduced competition and customer choice.163 On the other hand, the personalized
nature of these traditional lending relationships could give rise to subtle bias and even
discrimination. Reliance on impersonalized systems such as credit-scoring and the like
has substantially reduced racial and other improper bias from the lending decision,
thereby leading to an expansion of credit to traditionally underserved individuals.164
Finally, the nationalization of credit has generated competition on a massive scale. For
instance, there are currently over 6,000 issuers of credit cards, and barriers to entry are
low. This has led to robust static and dynamic competition in the credit card market,
driving economic efficiency and pro-consumer innovation.165
The greater impersonalization of consumer credit has had dramatic consequences
in expanding customer choice and liberating customers from the constraints of traditional
credit choices. But this increasing impersonalization of lending also tends to undermine
the moral obligation that borrowers feel toward lenders, thereby increasing the likelihood
that the debtor would engage in post-contractual opportunism and to avoid repaying these
debts. For instance, as noted earlier, in order to reduce debtor guilt regarding bankruptcy,
lawyers distinguish between personal moral obligations owed to family and friends,
versus financial obligations owed to credit card lenders and other abstract institutions.166
Such a distinction between debts owed to friends versus institutional lenders would not
have been as tenable in the past, when most credit was local in nature and often bundled
with retail transactions from a lender who was also a local merchant and neighbor. This
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decline of a trust relationship between lenders and borrowers may help to explain the
increasing willingness to discharge these contractual obligations though bankruptcy.
In addition to leading to a decrease in personal shame, there has also been a
reduction in the constraint imposed by repeat dealing.

Repeat dealing constrains

opportunistic behavior by holding out the prospect that the long-term benefit from the
maintenance of the continue relationship exceeds the gain that an individual could make
by acting opportunistically.167

Consumer borrowers historically had limited credit

options, primarily because of geographic limitations on the number of credit issuers with
whom the debtor could reasonably interact. Traditionally, retail goods and credit were
tied together, such that a borrower who failed to pay his credit bills would be unable to
purchase goods on credit in the future.168 It was also relatively more expensive for
debtors in prior eras to relocate to a new community to start over after filing bankruptcy.
Given this small number of credit issuers, the debtor dared not to default, as it would be
exceedingly difficult to obtain credit in the future. The fact that the debtor was locked
into repeat-dealing relationships with a relatively small number of credit issuers with
whom he would have to deal in the future placed constraints on the willingness of the
debtor to breach his promises.
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See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); Lester G. Telser, A Theory of
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credit transaction from the goods that were purchased may weaken the borrower’s sense of reciprocal
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I have seen no evidence on this point, although it is a plausible hypothesis. I would like to thank Professor
Owen Jones for suggesting this observation.
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Today, by contrast, the multitude of options available to a former bankrupt
removes much of this constraint imposed by repeat dealing. Although bankruptcy filers
will face some restriction on the number of creditors who will lend to them and may have
to pay somewhat higher credit terms, post-bankruptcy debtors will find a relatively
vibrant and competitive market for lending.169 Thus, a bankruptcy filer is not required to
go back to the same lenders with whom she previously dealt.

This attenuates the

constraint of repeat-dealing relationships, thereby increasing the debtor’s willingness to
file bankruptcy at the margin.
For similar reasons, these developments have attenuated the constraining effects
of reputation.170 Maintaining a reputation-based system of contract enforcement also
requires the maintenance of a system of ostracism, both for the “defector,” but also for
any member who enters into later dealings with the defector.171 This willingness to
punish a defector even at some cost to oneself (or to forego the benefits of trading with
her) creates a public goods problem, which can lead to free riding by others who are
benefited but do not have to bear the cost themselves.172 The willingness to punish
someone who fails to punish the initial party creates a second-order public goods
problem. Such punishment raises substantial collective action problems, as it becomes
necessary not only to monitor misbehavior by the original party, but it is also necessary to
monitor the behavior of all the other members of the group to ensure that they are not

169

See discussion supra at notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
Reputation in this context can be distinguished from repeat-dealing in that the discipline of repeatdealing turns on the bilateral exchange between a specific borrower and lender, whereas reputation includes
monitoring and punishment by third-party lenders. For purposes of this article, sanctioning behavior by
other consumers is labeled as “social norms” or “social stigma” to distinguish it from the commercial
reputation effects of third-party lenders.
171
I use the term “defector” here in the descriptive manner used in the game theory literature to refer to a
non-cooperator, here the bankruptcy filer.
172
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §8.5 (6th ed. 2003)
170
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reneging on their independent promise to ostracize those who cheat one member of the
group. As the size of the group increases, it becomes increasingly difficult to overcome
these collective action problems and to detect and punish those who fail to punish the
original defector.
This collective action problem explains, in part, the relative ease with which
bankruptcy filers today can find access to credit following bankruptcy as compared to
prior eras. Staten found, for instance, that bankruptcy filers who reacquired credit were
much more likely to obtain credit from a new lender rather than a pre-bankruptcy
lender.173

Whereas lenders may prefer as a group to ostracize borrowers who file

bankruptcy, in practice each lender has an individual incentive to lend to a debtor who
files bankruptcy. Ironically, a debtor who files bankruptcy and receives a discharge may
be a relatively better credit risk than prior to filing bankruptcy, because she cannot
receive another discharge for six years.174 The expansion of home equity lending further
reinforces this, because many lenders will lend on collateral even if they would not
extend unsecured credit. Thus, each lender individually has a private incentive to deal
with a bankrupt at the right price, notwithstanding the fact that lenders as a group might
prefer to “blackball” all bankruptcy filers.175

V.

What To Do About Rising Bankruptcies?

173

Staten, Impact, supra note 81, at 12. Nor did it make a difference whether a debtor discharged his debts
in chapter 7 or filed chapter 13 and presumably attempted to repay some of his prepetition debts. Id. at 16.
174
See 11 U.S.C.§727(a)(8).
175
This second-order punishment problem becomes more acute where the existing group cannot restrain
entry by new lenders who can enter the market to serve those subject to ostracism at the hands of the
incumbents. See POSNER, supra note 172, at §8.5, p. 262. Barriers to entry are low in consumer credit
markets, especially with the invention of non-bank finance companies, and in recent years, the greatest
amount of entry appears to have occurred in the subprime market, which specializes in lending to
consumers with previous bankruptcies and tarnished credit. See Zywicki, Economics of Credit Cards,
supra note 136, at 130-38.

59
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art21

This article has proposed a new model of consumer bankruptcy rooted in the New
Institutional Economics. It is argued that the upward trend line in consumer bankruptcy
filing rates over the past two decades has resulted from a confluence of three general
factors: (1) a change in the relative costs and benefits of filing bankruptcy; (2) a change
in the social norms traditionally associated with filing bankruptcy; and (3) changes in the
consumer credit market that have eroded the informal institutions of trust, repeat dealing,
and commercial reputation. Available empirical evidence tends to support the model, but
further testing will be necessary before reaching a final conclusion. Assuming that the
New Institutional Economics model of bankruptcy advanced here is correct, what, if
anything, does this say about appropriate reforms to the consumer bankruptcy system?
By synthesizing academic research and turning it into applied legislative reform,
the traditional model of consumer bankruptcy provided the intellectual foundation for the
1978 Code.176 Similarly, the NIE model of consumer bankruptcy described in this article
provides a conceptual foundation for many of the legislative reforms included in the
bankruptcy reform legislation.
This Part briefly reviews possible policy implications of the model described
here.177

In particular, three lines of policy reforms are examined.

First, proposed

amendments in the bankruptcy reform legislation that would reorient the relative costs
and benefits associated with filing bankruptcy. Second, policy initiatives designed to
reverse or compensate for the change in social norms that has reduced bankruptcy’s
stigma. Finally, I will briefly explore the implications of the model here regarding
fundamental reforms proposed by some scholars, such as eliminating the mandatory
176

See SKEEL, supra note 17.
I have addressed these policy arguments in more detail elsewhere, and just provide a brief overview
here. See Todd J. Zywicki, Bankruptcy Reform: An Economic Analysis (working paper).
177
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fresh-start provision of current law and instead reformulating the fresh start as a default
rule that can be waived by the debtor.
A.

Adjust the Relative Costs and Benefits of Filing Bankruptcy
The first and most direct policy response to rising bankruptcy filings would be to

rebalance the benefits and costs associated with filing bankruptcy. Increasing the costs
associated with filing bankruptcy, however, would not be appropriate, in that increasing
the deadweight cost of learning about and filing bankruptcy would advance no valuable
policy goal.178 The goal of the bankruptcy system should be to deliver relief to those who
are thought to deserve it, while limiting its use by others. Increasing the transaction costs
of filing bankruptcy surely would reduce bankruptcy filings, but this would advance no
coherent policy goal.179 Thus, the focus should be on decreasing the benefits associated
with bankruptcy, especially to high-income and high-wealth debtors who could repay a
substantial portion of their debts in bankruptcy but choose not to.
Several of the provisions in the bankruptcy reform legislation are designed to
reduce some of the benefits associated with filing bankruptcy.

To reduce the

attractiveness of bankruptcy for high-income debtors, the bankruptcy reform legislation
proposes to “means-test” eligibility of bankruptcy filers for Chapter 7 relief.180 Under
means-testing, a debtor would be required to have to file in Chapter 13 rather than
178

Unless, of course, the increased costs were just a by-product of reforms for which the benefits exceeded
the costs. For instance, proposals to reduce fraud and abuse could have small costs associated with them,
but have substantial offsetting benefits.
179
For instance, we could have a rule of randomly dismissing every tenth bankruptcy filing, which would
reduce filings, but would accomplish no coherent policy goal.
180
Bankruptcy Reform Act §102. A detailed examination of the means-testing provisions of the
bankruptcy reform legislation is provided in Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 181-208, on which this
Section draws. The relevant provision appears as §102 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. See also REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO ACCOMPANY H.R. 333,
BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2001 2 (Feb. 26, 2001) (“The
heart of H.R. 333’s consumer bankruptcy reforms is the implementation of an income/expense screening
mechanism (‘needs-based bankruptcy relief’) to ensure that debtors repay creditors the maximum they can
afford.”).
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Chapter 7, if she: (1) earns above the state median income, (2) could repay a substantial
portion of her debts out of “disposable income” in Chapter 13 after subtracting out a slate
of allowed expenses, and (3) does not have significant special circumstances that offset
the presumption of a chapter 13 filing. As a substantive matter, means-testing simply
institutionalizes the “substantial abuse” inquiry of section 707(b), but invigorates
enforcement of that moribund provision by shifting the burden of persuasion in cases
where the concern about abuse is highest.181 A debtor who is means-tested into Chapter
13 thus would not be denied a discharge on account of triggering the means-testing
provisions of the code; she would simply have her discharge conditioned on completing a
court approved Chapter 13 plan and paying off what she can to unsecured creditors.
It is estimated that approximately 7-10% of bankruptcy filers would satisfy all
elements of the means-test under the proposed legislation and be required to file in
Chapter 13.182 Because the means-test targets those with the highest repayment capacity,
this would result in a substantial repayment of debt currently discharged in bankruptcy.183
Under current law, by contrast, because of exemptions and pre-bankruptcy planning,
there is no distribution at all to general unsecured creditors in 96% of Chapter 7 cases,
and only a trivial distribution in other cases.184 Recovering some of this discharged debt
through means-testing would reduce bankruptcy losses and, therefore, the cost to lenders.
In turn, some of these savings would be passed onto consumers in terms of lower interest
181

Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 181-208.
See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 181-208.
183
One estimate concluded that means-tested debtors could repay 64% of their unsecured nonpriority debts,
or over $4 billion, in addition to all of their priority and secured debts. See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3,
at 187.
184
See Michael J. Herbert & Domenic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: The Distribution of
Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed in 1984-1987, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 303, 315-16
(1988); see also Michelle J. White, Personal Bankruptcy Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Economic
Analysis, 63 IND. L. J. 1, 38-39 (1987-88) (estimating average repayment rate of one to two percent in
Chapter 7 cases).
182
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rates, lower credit costs generally, and greater benefits to consumers. Because little is
known about the exact elasticity of supply and demand for consumer credit, it is not clear
how much of this savings would be passed on to consumers in the form of lower credit
costs and increased benefits, as opposed to increasing creditor’s return on assets.185
In addition, Congress could amend the Code to reduce the benefits of bankruptcy
to high-wealth debtors.186

The incentives of high-wealth debtors to file bankruptcy

results primarily from property exemptions and exceptions of certain property from the
bankruptcy estate, such as ERISA-qualified pension plans.187

Given the increasing

ability of debtors to act strategically to transfer assets to these exempt and excepted
sources as part of pre-bankruptcy planning activities, it may be appropriate to give new
statutory and equitable tools to judges to try to reduce these benefits by limiting the
amount of property that bankruptcy filers can protect through bankruptcy exemptions.
The notorious unlimited homestead exemption available in a handful of states has
come in for special criticism in this context, especially in the popular press.188 Other
exemptions under state law are potentially subject to abuse as well, but in practice courts
have been more deferential to protecting large amounts of wealth in homestead
exemptions than in other forms of unlimited or high-value exemptions.189 Even less
common is the concern that bankruptcy debtors will relocate on the eve of bankruptcy in
185

See Kartik B. Athreya, Welfare Implications of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, 49 J. MONETARY
ECON. 1567, 1583 (2002) (estimating that means-testing would reduce credit costs to households by
approximately $80 per year).
186
In addition, Congress could improve safeguards against outright fraud, such as concealing assets. The
FBI estimates that roughly 10% of bankruptcy filings have some sort of fraud, usually asset concealment.
See http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/fc/ec/bf/bf.htm. Although greater safeguards would reduce the benefits of
filing bankruptcy for fraudulent filers, it is sufficiently obvious, that it is not discussed in the text.
Nonetheless, many of the provisions in the bankruptcy reform legislation accomplish this purpose.
187
See 11 U.S.C. §510(c); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992).
188
For a comprehensive analysis of the empirical and political debates regarding homestead exemptions,
see G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L. J. 227
(2000).
189
See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES, AND JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY §8-32, p. 650 (1993).
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order to take advantage of other states’ unlimited homestead exemption.190 Nonetheless,
the homestead exemption is symbolically important, and even though the tangible
benefits of greater limits on homestead are relatively small in light of the relatively small
number of affected filers, the marginal costs of reform are small as well.191 Reducing the
amount of wealth that can be protected in a Chapter 7 filing by reducing bankruptcy
exemptions would also tend to cause a substitution by filers from Chapter 7 to Chapter
13, which might increase returns to creditors and reduce some of the benefits of filing
bankruptcy.192 There is also a high correlation between income and wealth, thus meanstesting high-income debtors into Chapter 13 will reduce some of the benefits of
bankruptcy even to those who retain large homestead exemptions.
A potentially larger problem arises from the interaction of rising housing values
during recent decades, the operation of the homestead exemption, and the blossoming of
home equity lending markets. By increasing accumulated home equity, increases in
home values also increase the effective value of the homestead exemption to potential
filers. Through pre-bankruptcy planning, a debtor can strategically increase her home
equity by paying down her home mortgage at the expense of her unsecured creditors and
then discharge her unsecured debt in bankruptcy. Following bankruptcy, the debtor will
likely be able to gain credit on a home equity loan, secured by the equity that was
accumulated prior to filing bankruptcy.

Because the loan is secured rather than

unsecured, a typical middle-class debtor with substantial accumulated home equity will
190

See Ronel Elul and Narayanan Subramaniam, Forum-Shopping and Personal Bankruptcy, Working
Paper 99-1, Department of Economics, Brown University (1999) (finding that a small number of
individuals relocate from low-exemption to high-exemption states for purposes of filing bankruptcy);
Vukowich, supra note 15
191
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
192
See Ian Domowitz & Robert L. Sartain, Determinants of the Consumer Bankruptcy Decision, 54 J. FIN.
403, 404 (1999).
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likely be able to obtain a home equity loan on competitive terms.

As a result, a

sophisticated debtor can essentially “launder” prepetition money to himself postpetition,
by combining the homestead exemption with a post-bankruptcy home equity loan.193
The proposed bankruptcy reform legislation would eliminate several of the most
egregious forms of abuse. First, any debtor who moved from a state with a limited
exemption to a state with an unlimited exemption would face a 2 year waiting period
before she could avail herself of the new state’s homestead exemption.194 This waiting
period eliminates the opportunity for a debtor to relocate on the eve of bankruptcy in
order to gain the benefits of a more generous homestead exemption. Notably, this would
prevent individuals such as O.J. Simpson, from relocating to a new state such as Florida
in order to take advantage of Florida’s unlimited homestead exemption.195 Second,
provisions in the reform act also would allow victims of securities and other financial
fraud potentially to reach the homestead assets of individuals such as Scott Sullivan, the
former WorldCom executive who owns a $15 million homestead outside Boca Raton,
Florida.196 Third, the legislation would permit a ten year statute of limitations for claims
that a debtor had fraudulently manipulated her homestead exemption as a fraudulent
transfer.197 The legislation does not impose a flat cap on the amount of equity a debtor
can protect in his homestead exemption, a decision that arguably is justified by

193

See Todd J. Zywicki, Rewrite the Bankruptcy Code, Not the Scriptures: Protecting a Debtor’s Right to
Tithe in Bankruptcy, 1998 WISC. L. REV. 1223 (1998).
194
Bankruptcy Reform Act § 307.
195
See Stephen Frater, Home $weet Home, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE 12 (May 31, 2004), available in
2004 WL 80356131.
196
Bankruptcy Reform Act § 322 (capping value of homestead exemption against claims of fraud,
securities fraud, and other intentional harms at $125,000 if acquired within 1215 days of bankruptcy). It is
not clear when exactly Sullivan acquired his Florida homestead. Frater reports the value as $15 million,
which served as collateral on Sullivan’s $10 million bail bond for his criminal securities fraud prosecution.
197
Bankruptcy Reform Act §308.
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federalism concerns.198

By preventing forum-shopping and fraudulent use of the

homestead exemption, the legislation eliminates the most glaring abuses of current law.
As noted above, there also appears to be a rising number of cases where debtors
file bankruptcy despite possessing substantial retirement savings.199 The caselaw results
are mixed on the willingness of judges to police this behavior and to dismiss these filings.
Certainly, judges could be more consistenly vigilant in reviewing and dismissing cases
where debtors possess very substantial exempt retirement savings. Unfortunately, the
bankruptcy reform legislation would actually move the law in the opposite direction, by
creating greater protections for retirement savings.200 Ideally, this safe harbor should be
struck from the legislation, although it was added some time ago in response to an earlier
proposal to codify greater restrictions on the exemption of retirement savings.
More fundamentally, by reducing abuse and by reducing the public perception of
widespread abuse of the system, bankruptcy reform will tend to increase support for the
bankruptcy system as a whole.201 By reserving bankruptcy relief for those who need it
and preventing abuse by those who do not, the reform measures discussed will increase
public confidence that the system is operating properly to forgive those who need it.
Measured reforms to reduce abuse, therefore, may help to head-off more sweeping
changes later that would attack opportunistic and legitimate bankruptcy filers equally.
198

It can be argued that this decision is defensible in that it appears that most of the cost associated with
generous state exemption policies are borne by other consumers within the state, in terms of less access to
credit, lower loan approval rates, and higher interest rates, than for residents of states with lower exemption
rates. See Gropp et al., supra note 41. Both the benefits and costs of a state’s homestead exemption policy
remain mainly within the state and do not spillover onto residents of other jurisdictions, thus this policy
choice arguably is protected by federalism principles. Thus, the two year waiting period imposed by the
legislation permits creditors to adjust to the higher risk of a debtor’s move to a more generous state.
199
See supra notes 50-55.
200
Bankruptcy Reform Legislation §224.
201
Cf. Posner, Tax Compliance, supra note 89 (noting that transparent tax shelters and other obvious
abuses of the tax system undermine faith in the fairness and integrity of the tax system and thereby reduce
voluntary compliance).
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2.

Reversing the Change in Social Norms

Societal patterns of cooperation or noncooperation usually develop over long
periods of time and can be very difficult to change. “Trust and distrust feed upon each
other,” Matt Ridley observes.202 “Stocks of social capital, such as trust, norms, and
networks, tend to be self-reinforcing and cumulative. Virtuous circles result in social
equilibria with high levels of cooperation, trust, reciprocity, civic engagement, and
collective well-being. These traits define the civic community,” writes Robert Putnam.
“Conversely,” he continues, “the absence of these traits in the uncivic community is also
self-reinforcing.

Defection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and

stagnation intensify one another in a suffocating miasma of vicious circles.”203 Thus,
undermining habits of reciprocity in commercial exchange will tend to erode the values
of reciprocity and trust in social, economic, and political relations.204
The vicious-cycle characteristic of the negative changes in social norms as well as
the diffuse nature of evolution of norms makes it difficult to identify particular policy
proposals that could reverse the deterioration of social norms regarding bankruptcy.205
Few theorists have provided persuasive prescriptions as to how to build social trust or to
reverse a decline in social trust.206 In fact, there may be little that law can do to reverse
these sorts of large social movements. According to the “expressive” theory of law,
however, legal rules can shape social norms at the margin. The bankruptcy reform
legislation contains several provisions that would be consistent with a goal of reinstating
202

RIDLEY, ORIGINS OF VIRTUE, supra note 97, at 250.
ROBERT PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY 177 (1993).
204
Frank Buckley refers to this effect as creating “distrust externalities.” F. H. Buckley, The Debtor as
Victim, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1078, 1086 (2002).
205
I assume for purposes of this discussion the desirability of reinstating traditional social norms regarding
bankruptcy and leave aside normative arguments about the desirability of this policy goal.
206
See Stephen Knack and Paul J. Zak, Building Trust: Public Policy, Interpersonal Trust, and Economic
Development, 10 S. CT. ECON. REV. 91 (2003) (identifying public policies that can build social trust).
203
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some of the traditional social norms regarding bankruptcy. For instance, it requires a
debtor to seek mandatory consumer credit counseling in order to try to work out a
voluntary repayment plan with creditors before she can file for bankruptcy which will
tend to reinforce the value of voluntary repayment.207 The means-testing provisions,
which require high-income debtors who can repay a substantial portion of their debts
without significant hardship to do so, would send a powerful social message regarding
the importance of living up to financial obligations to the best of one’s ability.208
Although not part of the current reform proposals, it also may be worthwhile to
reconsider the decision of the 1978 Code to de-stigmatize bankruptcy and to deemphasize the moral qualities of bankruptcy by resuscitating the traditional term
“bankrupt” and reconsidering the broad prohibition against discrimination against
bankruptcy filers currently found in the Code.209
In addition to trying to reverse the atrophy of social norms, it may also be
efficient to simply acknowledge this fact, and propose amendments to formal legal
institutions that correct for these changes. Much of the decline in social norms regarding
bankruptcy is an inevitable outgrowth of the increasing complexity and mobility of
modern society. Trying to reverse these trends in social norms, therefore, may not be

207

See Bankruptcy Reform Act §106. This provision has been part of all of the various iterations of the
bankruptcy reform legislation over the past several years and has been widely supported, even by critics of
bankruptcy reform generally. See SKEEL, supra note 17, at 207-08 (“From the earliest days of the [reform]
debate, the bankruptcy legislation included provisions requiring every debtor to submit to credit counseling
before filing for bankruptcy, and again after the conclusion of the bankruptcy case.”); id. at 207-08
(describing comments of Professor Karen Gross and lawyer Henry Sommer). On the other hand, some
have criticized this requirement as unnecessarily increasing the cost and complexity of seeking bankruptcy
relief. See id. See also David Wessel, The Muddled Course of Bankruptcy Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22,
2001, at p. A1, available in 2001 WL-WSJ 2855047 (quoting Professor David Skeel).
208
See Jones & Zywicki, supra note 3, at 207.
209
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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practical. Instead, it may be more promising to update formal institutions to serve as
“trust substitutes” that can take the place of weakening social norms.
There is an interaction between formal and informal institutions.210

Formal

institutions can be either a complement to or substitute for informal institutions.211 For
instance, informal measures such as reputation, repeat-dealing, and interpersonal trust can
be a substitute for formal rules of contract enforcement.212 Stuart Macaulay’s classic
study of commercial relations in business and the minimal reliance placed on written
contracts illustrates the point.213 Similarly, the traditional reluctance of the common law
to intervene in contracts made among family members reflects the implicit judgment that
formal legal enforcement of these promises adds little to their efficient level of
enforcement beyond informal extralegal enforcement of family ties.214 On the other
hand, where informal institutions are weak, legal enforcement of promises can increase
their reliability, providing greater opportunities for efficient reliance. As philosopher
Robert Goodin states the point, “Through the institutions of contract law, private
promises are publicly enforced. Public sanctions can in that way substitute for private

210

Some economists have remarked on the interaction between formal institutions and informal norms and
practices in policing opportunism in the context of corporate bankruptcy. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 122 (1985) (noting that in Japan “[t]he hazards of trading
are less severe . . . because of cultural and institutional checks on opportunism”); Marc Ramseyer,
Sanctions without Law: The Japanese Financial Clearinghouse Guillotine and Its Impact on Default
Rates, in Klein, REPUTATION, supra note 158 at 225. On the other hand, there has been little discussion of
the interaction between formal and informal institutions in the context of consumer bankruptcy.
211
See Larry Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553 (2001).
212
See POSNER, supra note 172, at §4.1.
213
See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Survey, 28 AM
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 55 (1963).
214
See Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract,
89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980).
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honor, and trust in the public institutions might therefore substitute for trust in private
individuals.”215
Increasing complexity of economic exchange tends to drive the institutions
governing exchange to greater reliance on more formal and abstract institutions.216 As
Anthropologist Sally Merry has observed, “With increasing social complexity, informal
social controls diminish in significance and are replaced by formal mechanisms of social
control.”217

The development of credit bureaus in the United States illustrates this

evolution of more formal institutions as trust substitutes as commercial exchange
becomes more complex.218 Credit records were initially proprietary, consisting of one
merchant’s records about borrower’s accounts. These proprietary records, however, did
little to constrain opportunism, as borrowers could simply jump from one credit to
another, taking advantage of each in turn. Merchants and lenders eventually came to
“pool” their information, formally and informally, allowing a more complete report on
each potential borrower and a more robust system of reporting on reputation. Through
this process, the first credit bureaus were born. They were local in scope originally,
215

Robert E. Goodin, Trusting Individuals Versus Trusting Institutions: Generalizing the Case of Contract,
12 RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY 381, 382 (2000).
216
See NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 11; see also Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the
Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724
(2001) (noting increased reliance on formal institutions in response to decline in “Old South” norms of
Memphis cotton exchange).
217
Sally E. Merry, Rethinking Gossip and Scandal, in TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF SOCIAL CONTROL
271, 288 (Donald Black, ed., 1984); see also Daniel B. Klein, Promise Keeping in the Great Society: A
Model of Credit Information Sharing, 4 ECON. AND POLITICS 117 (1992), reprinted in REPUTATION, supra
note 158, at 267, 271. A similar evolution towards governance by more formal institutions characterizes
the evolution of national courts and formal contract law. See Todd J. Zywicki, The Evolution of Contract
Governance (working paper).
218
See Daniel B. Klein, "Knowledge, Reputation, and Trust, By Voluntary Means," in REPUTATION, supra
note 158, at 1, 3-7¸ Daniel B. Klein, Credit Information Reporting: Why Free Speech is Vital to Social
Accountability and Consumer Opportunity, available in http://lsb.scu.edu/faculty/creditreporting.html, at p.
6 (“The histories of other social accountability mechanisms show a similar pattern of development—from
informal gossip to local associations to efficient integrated systems serving a great society.”); Klein,
Promise Keeping, supra note 217; Robert M. Hunt, The Development and Regulation of Consumer Credit
Reporting in America, Working Paper No. 02-21, Fed. Res. Bank of Philadelphia (Nov. 2002); Macaulay,
supra note 213.
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relegated to a single city or town.219 Over time, however, these local credit bureaus
pooled their available information into larger regional and finally national credit
reporting bureaus. Today there are three major national credit bureaus, with a variety of
regional and industry-specific bureaus as well.220 The development of national credit
bureaus with standardized reporting replaced more informal institutions of word-ofmouth gossip and local credit reporting. This increasing formalization of consumer credit
reporting both reflects and maintains national consumer credit markets.221
Where informal institutions weaken, the efficient response historically has been to
devise these formal “trust substitutes” to supplement and replace them. This logic of
creating new institutional “trust substitutes” is the animating logic of the proposed
bankruptcy reform legislation. Innovations such as means-testing, mandatory consumer
credit counseling, and the like, can be seen as efforts to develop institutional substitutes
for the declining influence of social norms that traditionally eschewed bankruptcy and
encourage debt repayment.
C.

Contracting Around Bankruptcy
In addition to the more gradual reforms proposed by the bankruptcy reform

legislation, some scholars have suggested the possibility of more radical reform, such as
by permitting consumers to opt-out of bankruptcy by allowing contractual waiver of the
right to file bankruptcy.222 Under this proposal, the right to elect bankruptcy would no
longer be a mandatory rule, but rather would be a default rule that debtors could elect to
waive by contract. In exchange for waiving the right to file bankruptcy ex post, the

219

See Hunt, supra note 218, at 8-9.
See Hunt, supra note 218, at 8-9.
221
See Marco Pagano and Tulio Jappelli, Information Sharing in Credit Markets, 43 J. FIN. 1693 (1993).
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debtor presumably would gain access to credit on better terms ex ante. The costs of the
mandatory bankruptcy discharge provision are substantial—one estimate places it at
roughly $280 per year per household and an increase in interest rates on unsecured credit
of 3.2 percent; others place the cost as high as $900.223 Moreover, these costs will
generally have their greatest impact on marginal borrowers—young lower-income,
lower-wealth borrowers who are most likely to be turned down for credit as the cost and
risk rises, who can least afford to pay higher credit costs, and who have the fewest
number of credit options. In addition, because these borrowers will have accumulated
lower household wealth holdings, they will be the most dependent on unsecured credit,
which is most likely to be adversely affected by increases in credit costs. Middle class
borrowers, by contrast, will be more likely to hold homes and cars, and therefore to
substitute from the use of unsecured credit to secured credit as the cost of unsecured
credit rises.
The consumer bankruptcy model described here does provide some support for
the proposition that the right to a discharge should be a waiveable default rule, rather than
a mandatory term.

The model indicates that some part of an individual’s decision

bankruptcy decision is a function of the strength of her moral and psychological
commitment to performing her contractual obligations rather than filing bankruptcy. This
particular information is private and idiosyncratic, and not observable or subject to thirdparty verification. Nonetheless, it is relevant information regarding the economic risk of
a loan. As a result, if this information could be accurately and credibly disclosed to the
market through signaling, it would permit a more efficient risk-based pricing, allowing
those with a stronger commitment to paying their debts and to live within their means to
223

See Athreya, supra note 185.
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obtain more credit on less-expensive terms. 224 Because of the mandatory discharge of
the current system, however, the ability to credibly provide this information to the market
is limited.
Making the discharge optional, rather than mandatory, would reduce this problem
of asymmetric information by enabling credible signaling to the market of one’s private
information regarding personal reliability and psychological commitment to repaying
one’s debts and thus one’s lower risk. By agreeing to waive the discharge, the debtor
could signal his commitment to repaying that debt, even if he might otherwise be able to
discharge it in bankruptcy. Moreover, because this action would be costly to the debtor,
it would provide a credible signal that would be difficult to fake.225 As a result, the
willingness to waive the bankruptcy discharge with respect to certain debts could allow
more accurate pricing of loan terms in the market. Agreeing to waive the discharge
would permit trustworthy debtors to reveal private information to the market about the
reliability of their characters, while making it difficult for less-trustworthy debtors to do
the same.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Recent research has found that the rise in consumer bankruptcy filings over the
past twenty-five years has been caused by an increasing propensity of households to file
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See also Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of the Current Theories,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1993) (discussing argument that secured credit is a similar signaling device).
225
It may be objected that creditors could “force” debtors into waiving their discharge involuntarily. This
objection is not very plausible, however. First, as noted earlier, consumer credit markets today are
extremely competitive, and consumers have the ability to shop among many different lenders offering
many different terms. Second, unsecured creditors today could theoretically “force” debtors to give them a
security interest for any loan made; in fact, lenders do not and cannot impose security interests on debtors,
and there is no reason to believe that they will be any more successful in forcing debtors to waive their
discharge.
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bankruptcy in response to financial shocks, rather than worsening household financial
condition. This article has offered a model of the consumer bankruptcy process that can
explain these trends. Although the empirical evidence to support the model is still early
in its development, it generally tends to support the model. More empirical research
should be done.
This article is the first word, not the last, in the effort to develop and test a model
of the consumer bankruptcy process. Dramatic changes have transformed the consumer
bankruptcy system over the past twenty-five years. Nonetheless, the current system
remains largely unaltered and unresponsive to this revolution. Most research for the past
several decades has been designed around the traditional model of consumer bankruptcy.
This paper calls for a new era in consumer bankruptcy scholarship that will help us to
understand the world we observe today, rather than that of the past.
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